INQUIRY
MAGAZINE
MARCH 20, 1978 • $1.25

Nat Hentoff: *The ACLU's Summer Soldiers*

Barton Bernstein: *The Habit of Total War*

John Hanrahan: *Bushwhacking Burchett*

Italy's New Class, France's New Legions

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THE THERAPEUTIC state has become so much a part of our lives that only by placing the phenomenon in historical perspective can we see it clearly. That is why INQUIRY is pleased to have in this issue a major article by Peter Schrag on "The Origins of the Therapeutic State." Schrag's thesis is intriguing: that the current acceptance of social intervention is, in fact, a perversion of "the most American of beliefs, faith in the perfectibility of man."

The origins of the therapeutic state

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France's new foreign legions

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

Stonewalling, Carter-style

■ Two Justice Department lawyers defending the FBI against charges that the agency illegally spied on Chicago-area citizens told a federal judge here [Chicago] Wednesday that they were defying his orders to produce documents in the case with the "expressed authorization" of U.S. Attorney General Griffin B. Bell and Solicitor General Wade H. McCree, Jr. . . .

[U.S. District Judge Alfred Y.] Kirkland told the two that they were engaging in "stonewall" tactics to "delay and stall." At one point in the hearing, the judge said, "You and your clients, you place yourself above the law. You would be great heroes with the Watergate defendants. . . ."

A Justice Department spokesman for Bell said that "the attorney general approved a course of action designed to seek a protective order against extensive class discovery."

—Los Angeles Times, Feb. 9, 1978

Doing well by doing good

■ The Carter administration will be offering private business firms subsidies averaging about $5,000 a worker to hire and train hard-to-employ youths under a $400 million program unveiled Monday in the President's budget.

—Los Angeles Times, Jan. 24, 1978

How to lie with numbers

■ President Carter imposed an $8.6 billion ceiling today on sales of arms to nonallied countries for the 1978 fiscal year. . . . Approximately $2.5 billion in military construction projects, mostly in Saudi Arabia, were not included under the ceiling. . . . Lucy P. Benson, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, said that Mr. Carter's pledge to reduce military sales referred only to "weapons-related" equipment.

—New York Times, Feb. 2, 1978

■ Exempting sales of technical military services from the arms sales ceiling is a glaring omission designed to conceal major increases in US involvement in the international arms trade. The huge increase in technical services itself results from the US sale of increasingly sophisticated weapons systems to nations like Iran. As well as seriously escalating the qualitative international arms race, US technical advisors are required to help operate such advanced weapons systems. The presence of large numbers of US advisors, whether civilian or military, seriously increases US military involvement in other countries.

—Institute for Policy Studies report, Feb. 3, 1978

What principles?

■ In a recent interview, Cord Meyers, founder of the United World Federalist movement, former assistant deputy director of the CIA for clandestine operations, and the man in charge of the agency's covert subsidies to American student organizations in the 1950s and 1960s, reflected on his years with the Company: "It was true, and in some ways still is true, that the CIA is the best place in government to assess, to reason, to understand what is going on in the world. There have been some abuses, but in one sense you can accuse the agency of only having been an obedient servant. I mean, no doubt there were times when certain things were done that no moral man could approve, but I honestly feel I never once had to compromise my principles."

—Washington Post, Feb. 7, 1978

For friends, we make exceptions

■ The State Department has concluded that the governments of three countries with long-standing military ties to the United States—Iran, South Korea, and Nicaragua—continue to engage in widespread violations of human rights.

But, despite a 1976 law requiring such abuses to be considered in allocating military aid, only Nicaragua has been marked for a major cutback in military assistance under the Carter administration's 1979 foreign aid budget.

—Washington Post, Feb. 7, 1978

■ State Department spokesman John Trattner, asked about reports of the execution of a Saudi princess and her gentleman friend for eloping, told the press: "If it is true, as reported, we do regret it.

"However, it is not up to us, from here, to complain or make comments about how other nations carry out their laws."

—Transcript of State Department news briefing, Feb. 2, 1978

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The Rhodesian agreement

Perpetuating the basic injustice

THE NEW AGREEMENT-IN-PRINCIPLE FOR the transfer of Rhodesia to black majority rule is in trouble from the very start. It is true that Prime Minister Ian Smith has shown great political skill in concluding a pact with three important black leaders: Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the United African National Council; the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, who heads the small African National Council; and Senator Jeremiah Chirau, longtime member of the Smith government and head of the government-dominated organization of tribal chiefs, the Zimbabwe United People's Organization. The militant black nationalist guerrilla forces, however, led by the Patriotic Front, will fight on, refusing to have anything to do with the agreement.

The agreement does not adequately resolve the two most basic issues in the Rhodesian crisis: representation and land. Originally, Smith wanted property qualifications for voting that would have disfranchised the bulk of the blacks (who comprise 96 percent of the total population), and a separate all-white Senate to block majority-supported measures. He has now conceded universal suffrage; the only check on democracy is that 28 of the 100-member National Assembly seats are to be reserved for whites for at least 10 years. This seems like a small number of whites, but it will be enough to block any alteration of the "safeguards" granted to the whites in the agreement, for any change in those clauses will require 78 votes.

The agreement will mean a continuation of the present regime under a new guise. The judiciary, the army, the police, and the civil service are to be "safeguarded" from the legislature. Apparently this means that all present white officials and army officers will stay in their posts. Furthermore, the agreement specifically guarantees the continued payment of pensions, even to retired (white) government employees who have left Rhodesia.

It is highly doubtful that the black population of Rhodesia will greet with enthusiasm the same white officials who oppressed them during the Smith regime, simply because these officials are supposed servants of majority rule. They may be pardoned for seeing little difference in their daily lives from one regime to the next.

The single most important aspect of the agreement, which has received very little attention from the American press, is land. This provision, part of what the *New York Times* blandly refers to as a "bill of rights," guarantees all Rhodesians against confiscation or nationalization of their land or other property. But the present land system is the key to white oppression in Rhodesia. For the history of Rhodesia since the white conquest in the late nineteenth century has been a series of land grabs by which the white settlers, using the coercive power of the white-dominated government, stole the productive land of Rhodesia from the Africans. As a result of these land grabs, 6000 white farmers own fully one-half of Rhodesia's best land, while 4 million blacks must try to make their livelihood on the other half. Nor can the whites use the standard colonialist excuse that white land use was more productive than that of the native. For, as Robin Palmer points out in his important new book, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia,* the land grabs down through the 1930s were largely motivated by a fear of facing the successful competition of African farmers, whose methods of cultivation were far more productive than those of the whites.

In the long run, the only just solution—and the only solution blacks are likely to accept—is the return of their own land. By signing the agreement, Smith and the black leaders have frozen Rhodesia's land in the hands of thieves. By ratifying this basic injustice, they have put the new regime in a hopeless situation from the beginning. ❏

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NAT HENTOFF

Summer soldiers of the First Amendment

DURING THE FALL OF LAST year, she had been speaking at synagogues about the First Amendment—more specifically, about the First Amendment rights of certain Nazis to demonstrate in Skokie, Illinois. Her credentials: She had barely escaped the Holocaust herself, had grown up in Israel, and had long been active in American Jewish organizations. She is also on the board of directors of the New York Civil Liberties Union.

"I have been shouted down, cursed, vilified," she said to me of her synagogue journeys. "They tell me that Nazis have no rights, and I try to tell them the First Amendment has to be for everyone—or it will be for no one. They will not hear this. God, I understand how they feel, but when will they *think* again?"

I too have been speaking in support of the American Civil Liberties Union's defense of the free-expression rights of those Nazis, and have had similar experiences. One afternoon, a white-haired lawyer in a New Jersey audience had earlier been talking with brilliant precision about various governmental invasions of First Amendment rights in the dreadful new federal criminal code (Senate Bill S.1437) that is now in the House. But when Skokie came up, the lawyer started shouting that allowing Nazis to demonstrate in Skokie would lead to Jews being shoved into American ovens. I, also a Jew, desperately wanted him to know that keeping the First Amendment intact was the best defense against waking up one morning and hearing on a loudspeaker that all Jews must assemble in Times Square—or its equivalent in other cities—within an hour. I wanted him to understand that I have had that fantasy since I was a boy in rampantly anti-Semitic Boston, and that I do not entirely believe it to be forever a fantasy. But he would not listen.

So many liberals and putative libertarians have been so infuriated by the ACLU's action in the Skokie case that 15 to 20 percent of ACLU's national membership of 250,000 has resigned or not renewed as a direct result of Skokie. No other single controversy in ACLU history has damaged the organization so badly. And in Illinois, where the state ACLU has been doing the legal work for the Nazis, some 30 percent of that affiliate's 8000 members have left in raging disgust—leading to serious cutbacks in staff and programs.

In one respect, however, the furor over Skokie has been usefully instructive—a blistering reminder of the selective belief in the First Amendment that characterizes even once and former card-carrying members of the one national organization entirely concerned with battling the myriad enemies of the Bill of Rights. The extent of the defections from its ranks came as a surprise, however, to officials and staff lawyers of the ACLU. They had expected to be badly bruised by the disclosure last summer that from 1953 to 1959, certain officers of the ACLU had been secretly cooperating with the FBI's search for "Communists and subversives" within the organization.

"I was sure we'd get a lot of resignations," a member of the ACLU staff told me, "from people who thought we had no credibility anymore—even though the present leadership could no more cooperate with the FBI than they could support prayers in the schools. Yet no resignations came because of the FBI revelations. But when Skokie erupted and we proved how much credibility we do have in terms of the First Amendment, that's when the earth really moved."

So much has been written about the exceedingly high feelings generated by this case that it may be helpful to review the facts. In the spring of 1977, the Chicago-based National Socialist Party of America (a coven of standardly noisome Nazis) decided to focus their demonstrations on suburban areas with sizable Jewish populations. Skokie suited their provocative purpose. Of its 70,000 residents, some 40,000 are Jews, and of the latter, 7000 are survivors of the Holocaust.

The Nazis intended to march in Skokie on May 1 and July 4, but the village obtained a circuit court injunction preventing the demonstrations. Enter the American Civil Liberties Union, on the side of the Nazis, followed by a series of court skirmishes leading to a July 1977 decision by the Illinois Appellate Court that the Nazis could demonstrate or march in Skokie but were absolutely forbidden to display or wear the swastika.

As a result of the Skokie case 15 to 20 percent of the ACLU's membership has resigned or not renewed.

"The swastika," declared the court, "is a personal affront to every member of the Jewish faith, in remembering the nearly consummated genocide of their people committed within memory by those who used the swastika as their symbol." And that symbol, the court added, is not protected by the First Amendment because it could very well provoke violent reaction among certain Jews of Skokie, particularly those who had barely lived through the Holocaust.

THE ACLU FILED AN APPEAL. On First Amendment grounds, the swastika is as fully protected symbolic speech as were the black armbands worn by those protesting the Vietnam War. To allow the state to decide which "symbols" are lawful, and which are not, is to weaken the First Amendment dangerously. After all, given that power, who can tell what the state will decide the next time controversial symbolic speech is tested? The state should have no power at all to regulate expression. And only expres-

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

TOM WILSON

sion is at issue in the Skokie case.

Those supporting the village of Skokie countered by claiming that this form of expression was deliberately calculated to ignite violence, and surely would—as the Illinois Appellate Court had said. Indeed, Skokie officials had testified that they would probably not be able to control the town's fiercely anti-Nazi citizens if the home-grown fascists were to appear.

In answer, the ACLU pointed out that it is unconstitutional to ban speech on the basis of a "heckler's veto." If Skokie was so sure that certain hostile groups would be hard to control, the ACLU pointed out, why did not the village seek an injunction against *them* to prohibit *their* unlawful actions. If extra police power were needed, it must be used to protect speech, even the speech of Nazis.

Also, keeping the First Amendment principle the same but changing the cast, what about historic "provocative" demonstrations? Recalling the Selma, Alabama, march led by Martin Luther King, *The Nation* noted that the Selma demonstration "would never have taken place if the authorities had been allowed to ban it on the ground that it would provoke the rage of white opponents of civil rights for black citizens and therefore endanger the peace."

This argument had no impact on the growing number of ACLU members who continued to send in their furious letters of resignation. Often they attached their membership cards—on the back of which, by the way, the First Amendment is printed. It was grotesque, many of them said, to equate the Nazis with Martin Luther King. As a letter to *The Nation* put it, "Martin Luther King's marches furthered human freedom and dignity, and aimed at spreading nonviolence, while the Nazis want to degrade and destroy freedom and dignity, and spread violence."

BUT NOWHERE IN THE FIRST Amendment does it say that freedom of speech is limited only to ideas and symbols that further freedom, dignity, and nonviolence. Or, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes put it a half-century ago: "If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."

Those who oppose the right of the Nazis to march often offer another argument, a corollary of the first one, against the ACLU's position: The Nazis, they say, aim at gathering the numerical strength to tear down the very institutions and principles that the ACLU presents as a shield for the Nazis. True, this particular Chicago cadre is small, but so was another seemingly ludicrous Nazi band in Germany. The more the Nazis are allowed to gain strength here, the more the freedoms of the rest of the citizenry—particularly those of Jews and blacks at first—will be in peril.

This viewpoint is a variation on the theory that the Constitution is not a suicide pact. Should a rational society permit unfettered freedom of speech to those who exist to destroy it? they ask. If it does, is this indeed a rational society?

Mr. Justice Holmes answered that question forcefully and lucidly in a 1925 dissent (*Gitlow* v. *New York*). Benjamin Gitlow and colleagues had been convicted of distributing literature proposing "revolutionary mass action" to replace the present government of the United States. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Joined by Mr. Justice Brandeis, Holmes took another view:

> It is said that the manifesto [by Gitlow] was more than a theory, that it was an incitement. *Every idea is an incitement.* It offers itself for belief and if believed is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. . . . Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be said of the redundant [Gitlow] discourse before us, it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. *If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.* (Emphasis added.)

HOLMES'S LOGIC IS INES- capable. If speech is to be free, there is always the risk that those who would destroy free speech may be sufficiently eloquent to use that freedom to end it. But if speech is to be limited to prevent that possibility, then the enemies of free expression have already won a significant victory—even as they are silenced. And once the concept of curbing speech is established, those enemies, each time the state suppresses speech, will have moved closer to their goal.

And so it happened in Skokie. On May 3, 1977, in order to bar the Nazis, the village passed a set of ordinances imposing criminal penalties on certain forms of speech and assembly. Without mentioning the Nazis by name, the ordinances first require that no parade or assembly involving more than 50 persons can be held unless there is at least 30 days notice for a demonstration permit—and unless a $350,000 insur-

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ance policy is obtained by the demonstrators. The latter, covering public liability and property damage, costs anywhere from $100 to $900, depending on the risk. You also have to find an underwriter willing to insure, and that is not always a real possibility—especially if you're a decidedly unpopular group. Also prohibited, under any circumstances, is any demonstration that will "incite violence, hatred, abuse, or hostility toward a person or group of persons by reason or reference to racial, ethnic, national, or religious affiliation." So much for Oliver Wendell Holmes's most basic principle of the Constitution—free thought, including free thought for those whose ideas we hate.

The lengthy notice for a permit, moreover, prevents ad hoc demonstrations—sometimes the most valuable kind, since free speech often has to be timely to be effective. In addition, the insurance provision turns the First Amendment into a document that discriminates against the lower economic classes. Suppose you don't have $100 or $900? Obviously the ordinances as a whole smother free expression. And so Skokie, in vehement reaction to the Nazis' assertion of *their* right to free speech, has managed to greatly delimit *anyone's* right to free speech in that now sterile village.

The ACLU has won more expansive victories. But it has seldom won a more vital internal battle than its decision to stay with the First Amendment rights of the Nazis to demonstrate.

Skokie, to be sure, has generally been characterized as a "liberal" community. But these liberals who do not understand the First Amendment have now constructed a law that, as the New York Civil Liberties Union's Ira Glasser says, "is the same kind of law that was used in Birmingham, Alabama, and throughout the South to stop civil rights demonstrators. It is the same kind of law that was used against the Wobblies in the earlier part of the century, and by Mayor Hague in New Jersey to stop labor organizers. And it is the same kind of law that was used repeatedly only a few years ago to stop antiwar demonstrations."

These Skokie ordinances—trampling the letter and spirit of the First Amendment—are also part of the litigation in which the ACLU remains stubbornly involved, despite its quite stunning loss of membership.

AT THE END OF JANUARY 1978, one of the court battles over the Nazis and Skokie reached the highest tribunal in the state, the Illinois Supreme Court. Overruling the Appellate Court, the justices, by a 6 to 1 vote, declared that the Nazis have a constitutional right to display swastikas in Skokie. Upholding the ACLU, the court explained: "The display of these swastikas, as offensive to the principles of a free nation as the memories it recalls may be, is symbolic political speech intended to convey to the public the beliefs of those who display it." Furthermore, the court said, anticipation of a hostile audience cannot justify prior restraint of speech.

The Illinois Supreme Court has dismissed another suit as well. Brought by an organization called Survivors of the Holocaust, the suit argued that psychological and emotional wounds caused by imprisonment in Nazi death camps would impel the survivors in Skokie to try to stop the Nazi demonstration, quite possibly by violent means. Here again, the threat of violence, however understandable, cannot be a reason, in law, to shut off speech.

Or, as New York Judge Charles Breitel said 17 years ago in another case that got the ACLU into trouble—the defense of George Lincoln Rockwell's right to speak in a New York City park—"The unpopularity of views, their shocking quality, their obnoxiousness, and even their alarming impact is not enough [to prohibit speech]. Otherwise, the preacher of any strange doctrine could be stopped; the antiracist himself could be suppressed if he undertakes to speak in 'restricted' areas; and one who asks that the public schools be open indiscriminately to all ethnic groups could be lawfully suppressed, if only he chose to speak where persuasion is most needed."

The clash of ideas, symbols, and emotions in Skokie is not over. There will be appeals to the Supreme Court; and if that body chooses to review any of the Skokie cases, the odds are that even the Burger Court will sustain the First Amendment, though the chief justice himself may be on the other side.

As for the battered ACLU, the run of resignations may be nearly over. "From the 1960s on," says Executive Director Aryeh Neier, "we attracted a lot of members who were not so much basic civil libertarians as they were greatly attracted to such of the causes we supported as defending antiwar protesters and the impeachment of Nixon. I expect that many who left us because of Skokie were from that group. We had, of course, been handling fundamental First Amendment cases all along, but for quite a while, those cases were obscured by these more visible actions. So now, the members we have left really do understand why the ACLU exists, and that leaves us with quite a strong base. What we have to recover is some of the money we've lost so that we don't have to cut down on more programs. Accordingly, I'm soliciting extra contributions from people who do recognize that if we had not supported the Nazis' right to demonstrate—with swastikas—the ACLU would have lost its integrity, its reason for being."

Neier, by the way, is a Jew, and a refugee from the Holocaust.

SKOKIE HAS TURNED OUT TO be a double lesson in liberty. The case itself has vividly illustrated the First Amendment meaning of symbolic speech and the indivisibility of all free speech. Simultaneously, the reaction to the ACLU's position by so many who consider themselves liberals and even libertarians has emphasized—as no other case in many years—how fragile throughout the land is support for the still revolutionary notion that the state has no business squashing anybody's ideas or symbols. *Anybody's.*

The ACLU has won more impressively expansive victories than its Skokie successes so far. But the ACLU has seldom won a more vital internal battle than its decision to stay with the First Amendment rights of Nazis even if the great majority of the membership were to fall away.

"Hell," said an ACLU lawyer on the case, "if worst came to worst and we had folded, these bastards and their fucking swastikas would still have had representation. I'd have taken the case on my own." ❏

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MAURO LUCENTINI

Italy: the politics of parasitism

AT THIS WRITING THE GOVernment of Premier Giulio Andreotti is approaching a reincarnation. In the Byzantine city of Rome, the power brokers are engaged in intricate dealings aimed at one more temporary solution of the Italian governmental crisis. The solution this time is intended to last until parliament chooses a new president of the republic in December; in particular, the solution is meant to carry the country over the six months preceding this ballot, a period in which, constitutionally, general elections cannot be held.

The negotiations to resolve the crisis, which began in mid-January with the fall of the 18-month-old Andreotti government, have encountered a major stumbling block. No one has yet been able to devise a magic formula that would avoid official participation of the Communists in the government—a development that would break up the Christian Democratic Party—and at the same time allow the Communists a more formal voice in ruling the country—which the CP requires if it itself is not going to break up.

Yet the main problem in Italy today is not whether the Communists are or are not going to be admitted into the national government. The much larger question is whether the country is to continue in a state of anarchy, drift, and decay unprecedented in the postwar Western world, or whether it can start back toward some sort of stability. Communism as a means toward the latter end, though it has raised great hopes in a sizable part of the population for some time, has come to appear less and less effective; hence the recent general decline in the fortunes of the Italian Communist Party—not improvement, as many abroad believe. Competent observers now deem the possibility of Communists entering the Italian government to be substantially smaller than it was only a few months ago, a rather startling transformation of the Italian scene (and one that coincides curiously with a similar loss of credibility of the left in France).

TO TRY TO UNDERSTAND what is happening, we must start by looking at the internal Italian situation, which is different from, and far worse than, what is portrayed abroad.

Most alarming is the social picture, which is more and more dominated by terrorism; in many areas of Italian life, the gun has become the real master. The judicial system has ground to a halt: For some time there have been no real trials in Italy for acts of terror, kidnappings, and "political" killings, for the simple reason that both judges and juries are paralyzed by fear. The press trembles, too: There are things that no newspaper, even the very few with some guts and some spirit of independence left, dares mention anymore, because of the direct risk of death. Many newspapermen have already been wounded and at least two killed. Carlo Casalegno, the respected deputy editor of Turin's *La Stampa*, was shot and killed last November because he let 30 words slip in an editorial, exhorting the courts to do their duty.

ANOTHER, IF LESS TRAGIC, example of the rule of anarchy is provided by the Italian schools. Here, teachers have been largely cowed by their students into giving passing marks and conferring diplomas and degrees without any work on the student's part. "A failed student means a dead teacher," reads the latest graffito on the walls of a Milan vocational school. The few teachers who initially refused the demands have been spat at, beaten, wounded. (Since the "piece of paper" is required to obtain almost any job in the highly bureaucratized, stratified Italian labor market, it is understandable that students coming from working-class, high-unemployment areas should ask for guaranteed promotion and an end to what they call the "elitist, repressive" school system.) In the universities the students particularly insist on high marks because they are necessary to qualify for a new subsidy instituted by the state—the *pre-salario*, accorded to worthy students as an advance on what society is supposed to owe them later.

The economic picture is a cause of wonder. Italy seems to be the first society in human history that has an economy working "in the negative mode": the bigger its debts, the greater its prosperity, or at least the prosperity of the

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privileged part. I refer to a quite sizable portion of the population that may be called the New Class. In Italy it is a class which through "planning" and "statization," through collusion between business and the political powers, and through the creation of a colossal bureaucracy governed by the political spoils system, has put itself on top of an impoverished country nearing bankruptcy. The institutionalized resorting to debts has become as much a feature of this grotesque situation as high inflation, decreasing productivity, and mounting unemployment. One of the best known Italian industrialists, Rovelli, head of a large chemicals firm, is said to have uncorked a bottle of champagne several years ago when he reached his first billion-lira debt. He belongs to a growing number of businessmen who have discovered that in order to prosper they have to connect with the government in a system of mixed bribery and blackmail, based on debt. That makes them immune to the ordinary economic laws: The state-controlled banks have to help them, because endangering their activities would mean increasing unemployment, damaging their creditors, and depriving the New Class of the means of survival.

The system, indeed, involves a permanent flow of government money to business firms, which in turn use part of the money to maintain the political parties that keep the government in power. This arrangement prevails especially in the media field, where the connection to political power is even closer. The Rizzoli corporation, biggest owner of newspapers in Italy and one of the largest publishers in Europe, is enlarging its empire at the same time that it is enlarging a deficit of tens of billions of lire. Almost all newspapers in Italy today are dependent on the handouts of the New Class state, but those of the Rizzoli chain have become an instrument of that class. So much for the "private" sector.

THE "NEGATIVE MODE" IS even more characteristic of the "public" sector of the economy —more than 50 percent of the total— because here the deficits, reaching enormous proportions, are made up as a matter of course by the state. Save for a few exceptions, all of the hundreds of companies that constitute the IRI (Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale) and similar state groups—from steel to candies and panettoni—lose money. The big Alfa Sud auto works of the Mezzogiorno, partly owned by the state, lose $2000 on each car produced and sold. The giant Finsider steel concern loses money on every ton of its product it exports to the American market.

In Italy, the New Class, through the collusion of business and the political powers and through the creation of a monstrous bureaucracy, rules a country on the verge of bankruptcy.

A conspicuous aspect of this dyseconomy is the presence of a caste of unionized workers whose labor cost per unit is double the Common Market average for productivity that is half that average. The unions that protect them, once controlled by the Communist Party but now largely independent, are concerned only for the privileges of their members and ignore the cost in terms of rates of unemployment and inflation that are the highest in Europe. Of this work force, which monopolizes in a closed-shop system both the private and the public sectors, virtually no one can be fired, no matter what the losses are, and no matter that Italian industry is operating at less than half of capacity.

Internationally, the foreign indebtedness of Italy has passed $20 billion, of which $7 billion is due to private banks. When the Italian treasury minister came to New York last summer, a consortium of alarmed American banks warned him that things could not go on like that indefinitely. Yet the next step the banks took was to grant Italy a further $0.5-billion loan. The main hope of the banks, I have been told, is to be able one day to shunt their part of Italy's debt to international governmental lenders, mainly the International Monetary Fund. Here too we seem to be witnessing the birth of an entirely new economic procedure, one in which the tail—Italy—wags the international dog in the following manner: "Active" economies such as the American one feed billions to the Arab countries in exchange for oil; the Arabs place the billions with American banks; the banks invest in "passive" economies like the Italian one (others are Turkey, Peru, Zaire), which are able to pay back the money only by asking for further credit. In order not to have the entire system collapse, the new credit is granted from further funds the banks receive from the Arabs, supplied in turn by the "active" economies.

*BOTH THESE UNUSUAL SO*cial and economic spectacles have gradually arisen in the last 15 years along with the emergence of the New Class. This self-appointed, self-serving state elite meets the classic definition given by Milovan Djilas to the ruling class of Eastern Europe, except that in Italy it has come into existence without an official Communist regime being proclaimed and includes an element based in the pseudoprivate sector. The system has been the result of close, covert cooperation between the Communists and the dominant left wing of the governing parties, passed off as rivalry between government and opposition. Both Communists and non-Communists compose the New Class today, even if the former, until now, have been somewhat underrepresented in it. No law of any importance has been approved in Italy in the last 10 years without at least the tacit consent of the Communists. Furthermore, parliament has been for decades a simple rubber stamp for decisions secretly arrived at by the political parties. Recently, even certain important local elections have been considered superfluous and postponed.

The collaboration between all the "progressive" forces and specifically between the two ostensible enemies, the government and the Communist Party, has been mainly directed toward two simple objectives: (1) to transfer from private hands to the state as many assets as possible; and (2) to distribute these assets among the members of the New Class. These goals have been pursued through a double strategy of corruption and intimidation, the govern-

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ment, as a rule, being in charge of the corruption, the Communists of the intimidation.

An interesting feature has been the voluntary help given by business, quite parallel to the help it gave to rising Fascism in the twenties. Business has very often found its reward in the growing government intervention; while it has sometimes resisted, at other times it has been eager to accept the system of subsidies and two-way corruption, and thus to enlist itself in the ranks of the New Class. The potential for cooperation between private industry and state socialism, by the way, was prophetically theorized at the beginning of this century by the great Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, and in 1946 it was the object of a warning from one of the first presidents of liberated Italy, the economist Luigi Einaudi.

The political-economic engine fueled by socialization and guided by planning has permitted the New Class to absorb and distribute among its members and supporters not only the industrial sector, but also the whole financial and banking system; tens of thousands of national, local, and paragovernmental agencies; the entire educational network (to a large extent the preserve of the Communists); most newspapers; the state radio and television system; and most of the state-subsidized cultural and artistic activities.

SINCE THE FOUNDATION OF the postwar republic, there has been a close parallelism between the political and the economic evolution of the country. The notion that the 40-odd governments that Italy has had in this period have been all of the same kind, all ineffectual, all ignored by a people who for centuries have been accustomed to "muddling through," is one of many misleading clichés about Italy. Actually, government control of Italy was captured by self-styled "left wing" forces at a precise moment in Italy's postwar history, with the fall of the center Tambroni government of 1960 (he was accused of "tolerating" Fascist "influences," a charge that is still commonly used by the left against its foes); the formalization of the process goes by the name of *apertura a sinistra* (opening to the left) and was formally effected in 1963. There are thus three clearly distinct phases in the political history of postwar Italy: 1945–1962, characterized by a governing coalition of center parties; 1962–1976, the period of the "opening to the left," distinguished by the formal admission of the Socialist Party and the growing influence of the Communist Party at all levels except the cabinet; and from 1976 on, the phase of the "six parties agreement including the Communist Party," with Communist participation in the planning of government policy, Communist parliamentary support of the government (in the form of "abstention"), and Communist entrenchment in power at all parliamentary and governmental levels except the cabinet.

Italian business has found its reward in government intervention; while it has sometimes resisted, at other times it has been eager to accept the system of subsidies and two-way corruption.

It is certainly not purely coincidental that these three phases correspond to equally sharply defined phases in Italian economic life: one of great growth—the so-called "Italian miracle"—in a regime of relatively free initiative and private enterprise (1945–1963); one of progressive decline characterized by the transfer of huge chunks of the economy to government hands and by growing government control and interference in the other, shrinking, half (1963–1974); and the present "negative" phase of utter stagnation, high unemployment, and high inflation, with the Italian economy kept going largely by foreign support. It is certainly not coincidental, too, that the "opening to the left" marked the first great acceleration of the formation of the New Class, and the beginning of a full-fledged spoils system among the parties involving all bureaucratic and government-controlled or government-influenced positions. Today even the operating rooms in the hospitals are shared according to the political allegiance of the surgeons.

The present trend toward formal association of the Communists in the government was meant to be a conclusive step in the process of consolidation of the New Class in its monopoly of power and privilege, a final phase where a formally authoritarian regime would be established both to keep the economy from complete collapse and to prevent any movement of protest from developing among the unprivileged classes. Should this last step be taken, it would be the first complete illustration, the first case history actually offered by an officially "free" Western country, of the thesis of Friedrich Hayek in his famous book of the 1940s, *The Road to Serfdom*.

But, as indicated at the beginning, this, perhaps, is not going to happen. The reason is that the Communist Party has suddenly appeared unable to fulfill any of the functions that it was supposed to perform.

IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS the Communist Party has been steadily losing strength and members, as revealed by its enrollment efforts in 1977. It has become the object of mounting attacks not only from the right, but, more ominously, from the left. If many of its former supporters accuse it of having "sold out" to the bourgeoisie, this is not because Berlinguer, the CP leader, has been trying to bring about the "historical compromise" of Communist entry into the government. Rather, it is because of the CP's part in the exploitive, parasitic society it has helped to create. Terrorism is shaking the country, and the Communists have no way of combating it, since it springs from sources that are outside their control: the disenchanted youth, the unemployed, the outcasts of the New Class system. Many of these unprivileged populate the shantytowns that surround most of the big cities of Italy, slums that are the breeding grounds of the Red Brigades and other anti-CP terrorist groups.

There is something ironic and fatal in the relationship between Italian Communism and violence. The Communists have capitalized for a long time on their traditional capacity for strong-arm action, manifested in the riots they have promoted at crucial moments of Italian postwar history (notably those that forced out the Tambroni government in 1960) and in strikes and intimidation by the once Communist-led unions. In later years, they actively encouraged the student and youth revolts—the precursors of

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today's terroristic activity—both in order to threaten the existing political structure and to post a claim as a party that could bring back order if only given government responsibility. But today, the CP looks more like the target than the interpreter of the popular ire. The unionized masses evade its control, as shown by the call for a nationwide strike in January that the Communist Party tried vainly to prevent. Terror and violence have turned against the whole of the New Class, Communists included, assuming an ultraleft and ultraright hue and establishing links with the Mafia and common criminality. In short, the Communists, unable to defend even themselves, have lost their charisma as a force for repression and order—a quality so essential to their bid for power.

THIS IS THE REASON WHY the part of the Italian New Class that exercises the highest governmental power does not seem eager today to accept the Communists as formal partners, especially since this would probably cause complications in the delicate international setup necessary to its economic survival. What then are the chances for a return of a modicum of stability? There are just a few glimmers of hope. One is the development inside all the old "center" parties, including the discredited Christian Democrats, of new and younger factions pressing for a return to old-style democracy and liberalism. Another is the formation of a vast "black market" of labor, now representing about 20 percent of the whole labor force, which operates clandestinely outside the planned, statized, welfarized structure created by the New Class. Actively opposed by the unions, it is becoming an important force for a return to productive and competitive work. The Fiat concern, for instance, one of the few big private firms still making a profit, has started farming out orders for automobile parts to black-market producers, who ignore the labor and social security codes. Finally, for the first time there is talk of efforts to re-privatize the economy (although a first concrete offer to buy back some state enterprises in heavy debt, made by an Italian-American group, has failed), and to the east, across the Mediterranean, there is the example of the Israeli government, which has announced its intention of putting the economy on a similar course. It is not much, in a bleak and threatening panorama.

JOHN HANRAHAN

The mugging of Wilfred Burchett

THE NIGHTRIDERS OF THE far right, along with the Hearst press and the one-time liberal *New York Post,* have in recent months been engaged in the journalistic mugging of leftist Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett.

Burchett's background and writings make him a natural hobgoblin for the political extreme right. A correspondent for two decades for the New York-based radical weekly newspaper *The Guardian,* Burchett has never made the standard journalistic pretenses of "objectivity" in his writings. Nor has he tried to hide his philosophy or mask where his sympathies lie: He's a Marxist who, in more than two dozen books and in thousands of articles, has backed leftist revolutionary activities throughout the Third World, and who openly supported victories by the North Koreans and the Vietcong in the United States's two most recent wars. Several times during the Vietnam War, U.S. officials, including Henry Kissinger, used Burchett's connections by having him convey messages or peace feelers to North Vietnam.

This unabashed philosophy has also made him a target of his own government, where for almost two decades he was denied a passport. Until his Australian passport was restored in the early 1970s when the Labor government came to power, he had traveled under papers issued by North Vietnam and Cuba.

The recent attacks by the extreme right and by some segments of the U.S. press, however, go far beyond charging Burchett with left-wing bias or anti-U.S. attitudes. Soon after Burchett came to the United States in mid-October for a two-month fund-raising and speaking tour, he found himself pilloried on the floor of Congress and in several major newspapers, not to mention such traditional forums for right-wing views as the *National Review, Accuracy in Media* (AIM), and the magazine of the John Birch Society. He was accused of being a Soviet KGB agent, and of having brainwashed and tortured (rather than merely interviewed for articles) American prisoners during the wars in Korea and Vietnam.

These charges against Burchett are nothing new; they were fully aired in an Australian court in 1974 in a libel suit filed by Burchett against a right-wing Australian publication, *Focus,* which had published the allegations. The jury in that case held that Burchett had in fact been defamed by the charges published by *Focus.* However, the jury also ruled that Burchett could not collect damages because parliamentary privilege applied in the case.

Focus had based its charges against Burchett on a speech made in the Australian Parliament by a far-right legislator; the jury determined that the publication's account of the proceedings was accurate and, therefore, immune from damages. (The privilege is similar to the constitutional one that applies to members of the U.S. Congress who cannot be sued for any statement, no matter how slanderous, that they may make during the course of speech and debate on the floor of Congress. And the U.S. press is generally immune from libel suits in reporting accurately on congressional and court proceedings.) The judge in the Australian case also held Burchett accountable for court costs.

AT ONE POINT LATE IN THE libel trial, according to a portion of the transcript cited by Burchett, the judge, after sending the jury from the room, commented to defense counsel: "You show me where there is any evidence on which the jury could find that he [Burchett] applied to become a member of the KGB and then became one; that he was put on the payroll; that he indulged in espionage for the KGB; or that he worked for the KGB in any other capacity. . . ." The judge also suggested to defense counsel that he "would be on safer grounds claiming parliamentary privilege" than in trying to argue Burchett was connected with the KGB. (Burchett, inci-

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

ED CRUGER

dentally, says the only spy agency that ever tried to recruit him—unsuccessfully—was the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.)

An appeals court later ruled Burchett had been slandered, and said the defense of parliamentary privilege could not be sustained. However, the appeals body also held Burchett's lawyer responsible for inadequately fighting against the claim of parliamentary privilege, and said it thus would not order a new trial because of the expense that would be entailed for the defense in recalling its witnesses from overseas.

Burchett's recent accusers on the right and in the U.S. press not only ignored the rulings that Burchett had indeed been defamed, and ignored the trial judge's comments about a lack of evidence to support allegations against him, they also misreported the final decision as a *defeat* for Burchett. Almost all the recent articles attacking Burchett state, or suggest strongly, that the jury upheld the accusations made by *Focus*.

The recent published attacks on Burchett have also leaned heavily on statements by Yuri Visilevich Krotkov, a Soviet writer and self-proclaimed part-time KGB agent who defected to the West in the 1960s. In late 1969, Krotkov (testifying under the alias George Karlin), told the Senate subcommittee on internal security that he had helped recruit Burchett as a KGB agent. A reading of Krotkov's 500 pages of testimony, however, reveal him as something less than a superspy and as someone with a vivid imagination: He also named as possible KGB agents Jean-Paul Sartre and John Kenneth Galbraith, as well as a number of top Indian, French, and Canadian diplomats assigned to the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet Burchett's accusers in no way suggest that Krotkov's reliability is open to serious question.

THE ATTACKS AGAINST Burchett in the United States were set in motion by Representative Larry McDonald (D.-Ga.), a member of the Birch Society's national council, with a speech in the October 18 *Congressional Record* labeling Burchett a spy and torturer. McDonald's allegations were immediately picked up in the November 2 issue of the Birch Society magazine, *The Review of the News*, in an article by former police and FBI informer John Rees. Rees, whose wife, Louise, a former police undercover agent, works for McDonald, is a confidante of the congressman and also produces *Information Digest*, a right-wing intelligence newsletter that provides information for the files kept on purported leftists by many police departments, public utilities, and corporations.

In his article, Rees misreported the libel trial decision as follows: ". . . the evidence was so overwhelming that the Australian jury took less than four hours to find against KGB agent Burchett and to order him to pay the $100,000 costs of the trial."

Editorials in the Hearst press attacking Burchett followed within days of the Rees article—and the Hearst publications also misrepresented the libel trial verdict. For example, the *Boston Herald American* stated: "The court dismissed his charges and ordered him to pay $100,000 in costs." (Hearst columnist Jeffrey Hart also attacked Burchett and referred to testimony in the trial, but did not print the verdict.)

The *New York Post*, in four mid-November articles written by William Heffernan, also gave an inaccurate account of the libel verdict. On November 18, Heffernan reported: "Burchett lost that suit and was ordered to pay $100,000 in court costs." And the following day: "Burchett lost that suit but insists it was a 'moral victory.' "

The *Post*'s editorial page chief, James Wechsler, himself a target of the far right in the 1950s, also took a potshot at Burchett—and also got the libel trial verdict wrong. Calling Burchett "a veteran of the international Communist propaganda machine" and "an enemy of the U.S." who was involved "in the brainwashing (and worse) of American PWs in Vietnam," Wechsler's editorial went on to state that Burchett had "lost" the libel trial "in the face of firsthand testimony of many of his victims."

At first blush, the *Post*'s attacks seem the most surprising because of that newspaper's past reputation for liberalism. But times have changed. The newspaper is now the production of Australian press mogul Rupert Murdoch, whose screaming headlines telling of sex, violence, and dangerous leftists have sold so many papers for him in Australia and elsewhere. The formula seems to be working in New York as well. By the end of 1977, the *Post* claimed a circulation of about 645,000—up by some 140,000 since

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Murdoch took over the paper a year earlier. There was speculation among some New York journalists that Murdoch had orchestrated the *Post*'s attack against Burchett, his fellow Australian and an old enemy. Both Wechsler and Heffernan disputed this.

WECHSLER, IN A TELEphone interview, said he had written the anti-Burchett editorial (titled "The Impostor") and that it had been his idea. He said he based it entirely on Heffernan's reporting and did no independent checking of the allegations against Burchett "because Heffernan had put in a lot of time" researching the series and it would have been unproductive "to go back over the same ground." Asked if the editorial wasn't based on faulty information (that is, that Burchett lost the libel trial), Wechsler said: "You'll have to take that up with Heffernan."

Heffernan said he stands behind his articles and does not regard his reporting of the Australian libel verdict as a distortion. Under Australian law, he said, a person can be defamed by the truth—and, he said, the jury had not determined if the charges were true or not. But to most readers, the phrase "lost that suit," which was used in two of Heffernan's articles, would mean that the jury upheld the allegations. Shouldn't he have spelled out in more detail exactly what the decision was so that readers could decide for themselves what the jury had ruled? Heffernan, like Rees of the Birch Society magazine, said he sticks by what he had written as being a correct interpretation of the jury's verdict.

Heffernan added that full reporting on the jury's verdict was unnecessary because CIA sources, a reading of the trial transcript, and interviews with Krotkov and former POWs from the Korean War had convinced him that Burchett had done what he was accused of.

As for the origin of the articles, Heffernan said that Bruce Rothwell, an Australian and an "associate of the publisher [Murdoch]," had passed along to the metropolitan editor a clipping from *The Guardian* showing that Burchett was in the country. Rothwell, Heffernan said, had wondered how a man of Burchett's background could get permission to travel in the United States. (Called for comment, Rothwell said he had had nothing to do with the Burchett articles.) Heffernan said Rothwell was merely passing along a story idea, and was not conveying an order from Murdoch to go after Burchett.

Heffernan's articles were by far more sensationalist in nature than even the Birch Society's. For example, Heffernan's third-day lead said that former prisoners in the Vietnam and Korean wars described Burchett as "a brutal interrogator, who filled them with fear, a man of great power who could say if they lived or died." (Curiously, the rest of the article never again mentions Vietnam prisoners.) One notable aspect about the former Korean War prisoners quoted in the story is that they had signed confessions that they had engaged in germ warfare in Korea—news that Burchett had reported in leftist publications at the time after interviewing some of the prisoners. The germ warfare charges proved extremely embarrassing to the United States and were vigorously denounced by U.S. officials at the time as Communist propaganda. Later, back in U.S. hands, the prisoners repudiated their confessions and claimed to have been tortured and brainwashed into giving them. In any event, it seems clear that former POWs who confessed to having engaged in germ warfare would not later feel friendly toward a man like Burchett who had conveyed their confessions to the world.

There was speculation that Murdoch orchestrated the Post's attack against Burchett, who is a fellow countryman and an old enemy. Both Wechsler and Heffernan dispute this.

BURCHETT DENIED ALLEgations in Heffernan's articles that he had been part of interrogation teams that had extracted confessions from the prisoners. Rather, he said, he was in the prison camps solely as a reporter. He said he had been told of the confessions by North Korean leaders and recognized that, if true, it was an important news story. He said he interviewed the prisoners to get their side of the story and to test the North Korean officials' claims. Burchett also quoted from statements he said he had received over the years from former POWs who said Burchett had interviewed them—not brainwashed or tortured them. Some even credit him with putting in a word with prison camp officials to get conditions improved.

U.S. State Department officials, in November press briefings and in January interviews with this reporter, have said repeatedly that they have no information to substantiate any of the allegations that Burchett had been a spy and torturer. Kenneth Brown, deputy director of press relations for the State Department, also wrote *The Guardian* that the department has "no evidence that Burchett is guilty of these actions," referring to the torture and brainwashing. Brown told this reporter that Burchett's political ideas were pro-Communist and "might be offensive to us," but that the State Department was following President Carter's lead in providing for "a free flow of ideas" from abroad. He also noted the Australian libel-trial verdict "that the court found that he had been defamed, but that the person he sued had parliamentary immunity."

All the State Department statements, however, weren't enough for syndicated columnist James J. Kilpatrick. On January 10, Kilpatrick assailed Burchett as "a scoundrel" and "the professional Communist propagandist who worked insidiously on our prisoners of war in Korea and later in Vietnam." Kilpatrick didn't even bother to mention the Australian libel trial.

Burchett did have his defenders in several radical publications, as well as Alexander Cockburn, press critic for the *Village Voice*, another Murdoch publication that so far has resisted serious Murdochization. Cockburn assailed Heffernan's articles as "deplorable indeed" and "disgraceful." The *New York Times*, ignoring the controversy, in early January published an op-ed piece by Burchett on what causes oppressed peoples to take up the gun. Perhaps it is a hopeful sign that most of the major news media ignored the affair because it suggests that the press may have learned something from the 1950s after all. Still, the Burchett controversy is a reminder that for some publishers the Cold War isn't over, and that Red-baiting can still sell newspapers. ❑

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THE ORIGINS OF THE THERAPEUTIC STATE

In this century, planners, therapists, managers, and other social engineers have succeeded in turning the American Dream on its head.

By PETER SCHRAG

BY NOW THE "THERAPEUTIC STATE" has become so pervasive that most people no longer notice it. The phrase itself has become a cliché, although hardly anyone can fully comprehend its scope. Each year some 7 million Americans are "treated" by psychiatrists or other members of the mental health establishment, most of them in public clinics; some 40 million take psychoactive prescription drugs—tranquilizers, antidepressants, antimanics, and sedatives—and millions of others are subject to psychological "services" in schools, offices, prisons, welfare agencies, and public housing projects. Some are conscripts, some are volunteers, and some can no longer tell the difference. Just before World War II there were fewer than 4000 psychiatrists in America. By 1977 there were some 30,000, nearly all of them trained with federal support, and the number of clinical psychologists, technicians, and other "mental health professionals" had grown proportionately. There are now as many mental health workers in this country as there are cops.

What's most significant about that phenomenon, however, is not its scope or its enormous growth—nor the fact that it was government policy which fostered that growth—but the ideology that sustains it, the faith in early intervention, in social sanitation modeled on public health, in the unquestioning belief that social problems are essentially medical problems, not problems of politics or economics or morals, and in the arrogant professional claims about the benefits of the services offered or imposed. In this country, ironically, that ideology is rooted in the most American of beliefs, faith in the perfectibility of man, and in the idea that this was to be the New Jerusalem and that the American was to be the New Adam, a person free of the corruption and constraints of the Old World and therefore free to make and

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shape his own destiny.

In a single generation—indeed in one decade (1908–1917)—the traditional faith was turned on its head. What had, at least in theory, been a rationale for leaving people alone, a faith that free men, or free land, or political conditions, or the frontier or, indeed, Providence itself, could create a world in which tomorrow would inevitably be better than today, became an equally unverified and unscientific—though in the end much more pernicious—theory of social intervention. Ultimately it fostered the domination of professional elites and bureaucrats, the manipulation of individuals in the name of "psychology" and "mental hygiene," and the creation of what was to become the therapeutic state. In that one decade American intellectuals discovered and seized upon: Freud and psychoanalysis; Frederick Winslow Taylor and scientific management; Francis Galton and eugenics; Cesare Lombroso and the "science" of criminology; Alfred Binet and psychological testing; John B. Watson and behaviorism. In response to the large numbers of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe and what has long since become known as "urban problems," American intellectuals discovered "race betterment," social work, and "mental hygiene," and they found each other as a self-conscious professional class. More important, they took the ideas of Binet and Taylor and Galton, combined and reshaped them into an ideology of intervention that came to look as American as the flag, and promoted them as just another blessing of the New World. "The history of modern society," said the historian Christopher Lasch, "is the assertion of social control over activities once left to individuals or their families." In the case of the mental health state, however, few changes were inevitable; they were not simply the product of impersonal forces. They represented deliberate choices and deliberate responses to specific conditions. The objective of those choices—and the result—was the manipulation and control of the individual.

THE ORIGINAL MODEL WAS THE FACtory itself, and its preeminent technique was "scientific management," the "gathering in," as Taylor wrote in 1911, "on the part of those on the management's side of all knowledge which in the past has been kept in the heads of the workmen," and the replacement of the employee's control of his job with control by the planners and engineers in management. Skinner, in an interview, said he had never thought much about Taylor and had certainly not been influenced by him; but it was Taylor who was the intellectual forebear of behaviorism and behavior analysis, of Watson, and of Skinner himself. Although Taylor is often described as the patriarch of the efficiency experts, the great inventor of the time-and-motion study, and although Taylor's prototypical example was a "sluggish" pig-iron loader named Schmidt, "a man of the type of the ox . . . so stupid that he was unfitted to do most kinds of laboring work, even," what really concerned him was "soldiering"—machinists and other skilled workers who, because they knew more about the work of the shop and factory than management, could effectively slow or otherwise control production. As the foreman of a machine shop, Taylor had discovered that "although he was the foreman of the shop, the combined knowledge and skill of the workmen under him was certainly ten times as great as his own." The idea was to restructure the work and the jobs—to de-skill the work force—so that technical experts in the management could run things.

> The essential idea [Taylor wrote] of the ordinary types of management is that each workman has become more skilled in his own trade than it is possible for anyone in management to be, and that therefore the details of how work shall be done must be left to him. The idea, then, of taking one man after another and training him under a competent teacher into new working habits until he continually and habitually works in accordance with scientific laws which have been developed by someone else is directly antagonistic to the old idea that each workman can best regulate his own way of doing work.

For Taylor the problem lay in the old method of "initiative and incentive"—the theory of free will that Skinner was to call "mentalism"—where the attitude of management was that of "putting the work up to the workmen." Under the new system, all the planning, analysis, and evaluation—all the thinking—would be done by an engineer-run department in separate offices removed from the shop floor, and the results broken down into small "tasks" that would be taught, step by step, to the workers. (This would be called "programmed instruction" in Skinnerian jargon.) The objective was not merely to downgrade the worker's skill—to wrest it away from him—but to give experts the mystifying paraphernalia, watches, slide rules, time sheets, to enhance the legitimacy of control.

To achieve his results, Taylor advocated not only his by now banal time-and-motion studies to analyze and restructure jobs, and to control the work, but also "the accurate study of the motives which influence men."

> It is true that the laws which result from experiments of this class, owing to the fact that the very complex organism—the human being—is being experimented with, are subject to a larger number of exceptions than is the case with laws relating to material things. And yet laws of this kind, which apply to a large majority of men, unquestionably exist, and when clearly defined are of great value as a guide in dealing with men.

The most wonderful part of Taylor's system, he would say, was that "under scientific management arbitrary power, arbitrary dictation, ceases; and every single subject, large and small, becomes the question for scientific investigation, for reduction to law. . . . The man at the head of the business under scientific management is governed by rules and laws which have been developed through hundreds of experiments just as much as the workman is. . . . " Both business executives and workers would be subject to the judgments and rules of the behavioral engineer. That was the very essence of the Skinnerian spirit. "In the past," Taylor wrote, "the man has been first; in the future the system must be first." The system taught the individual that he was incompetent and irresponsible, first in the plant, then in his own life.

The institution of Taylorism in American industry brought in its wake a great army of efficiency experts, motivation researchers, testers, and psychologists—people who would properly select, place, and train the work force and keep it functioning happily on the job—and, along with them, a growing faith in the powers of applied behavioral science which spread quickly from industry to education and other fields. Through the 20 years after World War I, the individual came increasingly to be regarded as a conglomerate of traits subject to measurement, the test increasingly important as a way of justifying school and job placement, and the methods of industrial selection and control increasingly common in other institutions. As Professor Ellwood P. Cubberley of Stanford, a leading philosopher of public education in the first decade of the twentieth century, wrote, "Every manufacturing establishment that turns out a standard product or a series of products maintains a force of efficiency experts to study methods of procedure and to

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measure and test the output of its work." A similar system had to be adopted in the schools:

Our schools are, in a sense, factories in which the raw products (children) are to be shaped and fashioned into products to meet the various demands of life. The specifications for manufacturing come from the demands of twentieth-century civilization, and it is the business of the school to build its pupils according to the specifications laid down. This demands good tools, specialized machinery, continuous measurement of production to see if it is according to specifications, the elimination of waste in manufacture, and a large variety in the output.

All sorts of techniques were applied to the process of rationalizing selection and control, but it was testing, first used on a large scale by the military in World War I, that became the great link among institutions and the universal embodiment of the common faith. As early as 1919 one management journal asserted that "authorities on psychology are now in agreement that through the use of psychological tests the degree of intelligence of an individual may be accurately determined," and by the mid-thirties it had become pervasive: Testing, used in factories, schools, hospitals, and clinics, became the universal rationale for intervention; it could predict not only success on the job, but incipient delinquency, mental illness, and other forms of deviance. Equally important, it could convert a whole set of more primitive social and racial attitudes into an alleged science of psychology; could turn the fears generated by immigration, industrialization, and urbanization into numbers and "scientific" jargon; could create new categories of deviance and deficiency based on the test itself, not on anything that existed in the real world; and could justify the practices that they generated in the name of medicine and science.

From their beginnings, the movements overlapped. Scientific management, intelligence testing, applied psychology, mental hygiene, and eugenics were often espoused by the same people.

YET TAYLORISM, FOR ALL ITS INFLUence in making the individual subject to control and in fostering the ideology of technological management, was only part of the great outburst of faith in behavioral science—the search for order—that took place in the generation before the First World War. Taylor's ethnocentric description of Schmidt as a stupid "little Pennsylvania Dutchman" reinforced his image of the man as an outsider fit for manipulation. But it also reflected the racism and class bias that ran and, to some extent, still run through many of the "sciences" of behavior and that, in turn, were deeply influenced by the genetic conclusions of Gregor Mendel, the social problems associated with immigration, and the Progressive politics of the age. If one could breed better plants and cattle through genetic control, why not better people? If one could organize the factory, why not the office, the public school or, for that matter, the whole society? If one could promote public health through sanitation or the pasteurization of milk, why not use similar methods to promote mental health and "social hygiene"? Here chronology may be useful:

1908. The American Breeders Association, organized five years earlier in response to Mendel's discoveries in genetics, establishes a Section on Eugenics and a Committee on Immigration. Henry H. Goddard translates the Binet intelligence test from the French and uses it to identify and study the "feeble-minded" in a training school in New Jersey. Clifford W. Beers publishes *A Mind That Found Itself*, the story of his three years in mental institutions and, later that year, founds the Connecticut Society for Mental Hygiene, thereby launching the mental health movement in America.

1909. Freud comes to America to deliver lectures at Clark University, and the first American edition of his writings is published. In New York, Beers and others organize the National Committee for Mental Hygiene (now the National Association for Mental Health).

1911. Taylor's book is published. A group of distinguished American lawyers and professors publishes an American edition of Lombroso's *Crime: Its Causes and Remedies*, which draws "analogies" between the "born criminal," the "moral imbecile," and the "epileptic"; describes the criminal as "a savage and at the same time a sick man," lists the physical characteristics of the born criminal, and prescribes various forms of "penal treatment" for the different categories of criminals.

1912. The National Committee for Mental Hygiene urges Congress to "provide for adequate mental examination of immigrants." The committee names Dr. Thomas W. Salmon as its medical director. Dr. Salmon, who began his psychiat-

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ric career conducting mental examinations of immigrants at Ellis Island, had been among the first to study the relationship of insanity to the original nationality of the individual.

1914. The First National Conference on Race Betterment, including some of the most important figures in American medicine, social science, and education, is held in Michigan. The purpose is to "assemble evidence as to the extent to which degenerative tendencies are actively at work in America, and to promote agencies for race betterment." Among the basic principles, according to Dr. Stephen Smith, conference president and vice president of the New York State Board of Charities, are "the education of idiots," "the reform of criminals," and the "curative treatment of the insane."

THERE WAS NO SINGLE STRATEGY: The race betterment people themselves were divided between those advocating sterilization or "segregation" of those they regarded as genetically unfit (generally estimated to be about 10 percent of the population) and those who believed deviants could be treated or reformed, between genetic determinists and Progressive idealists. Yet there was a consistent spirit: agreement that the disproportionate numbers of foreign-born inmates in insane asylums indicated serious problems in immigration screening; a general fear of impending race "degeneration" through disease, "mongrelization," or other dysgenic practices; a widespread belief that immorality, crime, low intelligence, and mental disease were often associated—that "feeble-minded" girls, for instance, were all potential prostitutes; and an overarching faith that through science the problems had been, or could be, properly identified and remedied.

From their beginnings, the movements overlapped. Scientific management, intelligence testing, applied psychology, mental hygiene, and eugenics, intertwined and interrelated, became fashionable together and were often espoused by the same people: Dr. Charles B. Davenport, the physician who was director of the Eugenics Record Office, secretary of the Eugenics Section of the American Breeders Association, member of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, and member of the Central Committee of the National Conference on Race Betterment; David Starr Jordan, president of Stanford University, chairman of the Eugenics Section of the American Breeders Association, member of the Race Betterment Foundation, and member of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene; Charles W. Eliot, president emeritus of Harvard, member of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, and member of the Central Committee of the National Conference on Race Betterment; Yale Professor Irving Fisher, vice president of the National Conference on Race Betterment, member of the Committee on Immigration of the Eugenics Section of the American Breeders Association, and member of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene; Gifford Pinchot, the conservationist, also a member of the Central Committee of the National Conference on Race Betterment and of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene.

The American pioneers of testing—Goddard, Lewis M. Terman, and Edward L. Thorndike—were all involved in the eugenics movement of the twenties and thirties, were all fearful that the descendants of what they regarded as inferior genetic stock—particularly Southern and Eastern Europeans—would take over the country, and were all believers in some version of Goddard's idea that the 4 million



Americans of "superior intelligence" had to control the country and keep "the masses" from trying to "take matters into their own hands." "It has been figured," said Terman in 1923, "that if the present differential birth rate continues, 1000 Harvard graduates will at the end of 200 years have but 50 descendants, while in the same period 1000 South Italians will have multiplied to 100,000."

"One sure service (about the only one) which the vicious and inferior can perform," said Thorndike in 1939, "is to prevent their genes from survival." To help the cause, Terman became a leading member of the California Human Betterment Foundation, which was credited with 6200 eugenic sterilizations in the 1920s. As late as 1966, in the midst of the civil rights movement, Henry E. Garrett, former president of the American Psychological Association and professor at Columbia, would argue that "you can no more mix the two races and maintain standards of White civilization than you can add 80 (the average IQ of Negroes) and 100 (the average IQ of Whites), divide the two and get 100. . . . It is that 10 percent differential that spells the difference between a cultured society and savagery." The tests proved that there were racial and ethnic differences in ability and intelligence (and therefore in "character"), made scientific what had always been known about deviance. In industry it was the Schmidts, the Wobblies, the Bolsheviks, and the labor agitators; outside it was "the feebleminded, insane, criminalistic (including the delinquent and wayward), epileptic, inebriate, diseased, blind, deaf, deformed and dependent (including orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps and paupers)." In a book called *Practical Psychology for Business Executives* (1922) Goddard told managers that "the

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intelligent group must do the planning and organizing for the mass. . . . Our whole attitude toward the lower grades of intelligence . . . must be based upon an intelligent understanding of the mental capacity of each individual." The tests proved why it was necessary to control or reshape them, sterilize or deport them.

Much of it was borrowed—testing from Paris, psychodynamics from Vienna, eugenics from London, criminology from Turin—and much of it logically could lead only to the conclusion that no intervention other than exclusion, segregation, or sterilization would make any real difference. What could be done with the "born criminal" who, in Lombroso's view, was probably an atavistic throwback to a more primitive human type, or with the lunatic child of a family of mental defectives, or with an individual who, according to the tests of science, was simply endowed with low intelligence? Testers like Goddard and Terman were prepared to follow the logic into eugenics, and by the end of the twenties Congress, in passing restrictive immigration laws, and nearly half the states, in passing sterilization laws, had followed it too.



YET FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, America began to twist the logic, to look for ways to get around it, and to press upon the science of behavior the traditional faith in the transforming power of the New Jerusalem. If America could turn poverty into affluence, ignorance into enlightenment, immigrants into citizens, why could it not convert deviance into conformity and illness into health? If the parent was hopeless, perhaps the child could be saved; if it was too late for hardened criminals, there was still time to intervene with delinquents, "incorrigibles," and truants. Since there were no officially recognized social classes and since national theology professed unlimited opportunity for every person no matter how low his station, the formal mandate for reform and intervention was theoretically unlimited. Science and medicine were showing the way: They might even enable America to repeal the laws of genetics.* "There is a hopeful future dawning for all classes of delinquents, degenerates and deficients, however handicapped by heredity, environment, accident or disease," said Dr. Stephen Smith, the president of the First National Conference on Race Betterment (1914):

> The science of biology and physiology, which reveals to medical art the minute structure and function of the ultimate elements of the vital organs and thus makes it exact in practice to the great saving of human life, is penetrating further and further into the hitherto mysterious mass of apparently homogeneous matter, the brain, and astonishing the world with its wonderful revelations. Here it has found the very springs of human existence—the centers of consciousness, thought, action—the home of the soul, the ego, the man.
>
> In these discoveries we find the basic principles of race betterment . . . and all our efforts to improve the individual and through him the race must center in the normal development and physiological action of the ultimate elements of the brain, the organ of the mind. . . . The great problem . . . is the betterment of all defectives as we find them in every grade of society. Considering the remarkable sensitiveness of the nerve cells of the brain to impressions born within and without the body, it is evident that the measures which may be employed to rouse the cells to activity and restore their normal functioning capacity are innumerable, and their effectiveness will depend upon the intelligence, patience and perseverance of the responsible caretaker.

It was possible to have it both ways; if the test or the diagnosis could be used on the one hand to demonstrate the futility of therapy, education, or reform, it could—and would—be used on the other to show that apparently hopeless cases, "however handicapped by heredity, environment, accident or disease" simply required earlier intervention and more of it. America had never acknowledged tragedy, frailty, or misery as immutable human conditions; there were only "problems," and problems were subject to correction. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that Freud took a peculiarly domesticated form in America—as he did nowhere else—or that, as a historian of psychiatry wrote a generation ago, "this country is second to none in the application of psychopathological principles to medical and social problems." Civilization and its discontents were ignored but the psychoanalytic and therapeutic messages were heard. By the mid-thirties every social worker in America had had some psychiatric training (most of it Freudian), and almost every major city had its child guidance clinics to bridge "the gap [as two of its advocates said in 1934] between a period when delinquency, dependency, and mental disease were attacked single handed by separate professional groups, and a future in which mental health may be as well guarded at danger points by an integrated social program as physical health begins to be."

With the exception of scientific management in industry, the movements that grew out of the Progressive Era were richer in aspiration and ideology than they were in technique. There was sterilization (as specifed in the Indiana law) of "confirmed criminals, idiots, imbeciles and rapists";

** In their introduction to the American edition of Lombroso's book, a group of distinguished American lawyers and law professors, among them Roscoe Pound of Harvard and Ernst Freund of Chicago, pointed out that crime, like disease, had "natural causes" and that "the individualization of disease, in cause and treatment, is the dominant truth of modern medical science."*

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For two generations, the intervention that followed the therapeutic ideology was limited by the crudeness and expense of the techniques available. Today technology mitigates those limits.

there was fever treatment for paresis (the syphilis-caused "general paralysis of the insane"); and by the late thirties, the beginnings of electroshock and lobotomy. But for the most part "treatment," generally limited to schools, prisons, and mental hospitals, relied largely on physical restraint, counseling, and punishment. Yet the faith in effective remedies was sustained—probably had to be sustained in the absence of the formal class structures and the historic sense of limits and tragedy that dampened expectations in other societies and that helped keep people in their place. Early in the twenties the testers, sifting through the scores of World War I recruits, came to the logically dubious conclusion that, as one writer said, "the average mental age of Americans is only about fourteen," and, after the end of World War II, William C. Menninger, who had been the Army's chief psychiatrist, reported the equally startling finding that of some 15 million men examined for induction, 1.875 million were unfit for neuropsychiatric reasons. The tests "proved" not only that there was a science of behavior which could define, diagnose, and explain social and mental problems, but also the fact that a large proportion of Americans were mentally sick, intellectually feeble, and socially inadequate, and therefore required attention.

The process was—and is—tautological: The faith in effective remedies justified the diagnosis and the test; the test justified the faith and, at the same time, obviated some of the more invidious labels of the race, class, and culture. Furthermore, since there were—as there are today—few effective educational or medical remedies for the conditions defined by the tests, the behavioral scientists who were interested in correcting these conditions were forced to resort to incarceration, segregation, and control (which are often promoted as "therapy" but which, in practice, are not very different from the remedies proposed by the eugenicists). The test, which had been promoted as a diagnostic tool, thus became not a guide to treatment but an instrument of mystification that taught the losers they were disqualified or incarcerated or segregated on "objective" criteria and that reinforced the authority of the tester as the possessor of special knowledge and powers.

FOR TWO GENERATIONS, THE INTERvention that followed the therapeutic ideology was limited by the crudeness and expense of the techniques available. Until the early fifties, the primary instruments of "mental health" were either too weak (talking therapy) or too "radical" (lobotomy, electroshock) and, in either case, too expensive. Until the end of World War II the primary instruments of education were rote learning and punishment with the paddle. But with the introduction of Thorazine in 1954 and of the profusion of other tranquilizers and psychoactive drugs in the years which followed, the ideology found a technology that mitigated those limits.

With the drugs and with the use of Skinnerian conditioning, control became relatively smooth—could be exercised, that is, with a much smaller likelihood of resistance and with a smaller range of obvious side effects. (The fact that the drugs do often produce dangerous, crippling, and sometimes fatal consequences—a fact still rarely advertised by the profession that has become so dependent on them—remains the most effective barrier to even more promiscuous medication; but as they get smoother, producing fewer medical side effects, resistance to their administration will inevitably decline.) The ideal method, Skinner said, is one that is so smooth that the subject will not even be aware that his behavior is being shaped, let alone have the ability to resist. There are still no cures for crime or "mental illness" or the failure to learn, but the ideology is now liberated from many of its economic and legal constraints; it thus becomes easy to join the ideals of "service" and "therapy"—the arrogant claim that it's all for the client's own good—to the expansionist ambitions of control-oriented institutions and practitioners, and easy to carry testing, screening, and intervention into areas where it could never have existed before. "Income taxes," wrote Leopold Bellak, a New York psychiatrist (1970), "were once considered basic violations of personal freedom, and fluoridation of water was held to be a subversive plot. If a Clean Meat Bill and a Truth in Lending Act were finally enacted, why should a 'Sound Mind Bill' (requiring universal screening and treatment for mental illness) be far behind?"

In industry, the techniques of behavior control are theoretically limited by the productive and managerial objectives of the enterprise. In social service, where the individual is supposed to be the beneficiary—education, mental health, penology, welfare—there are no theoretical limits, few scientific tests of success, and often not the vaguest means of validating the means employed. Skinner and the behaviorists added almost nothing to the technology of control; there is nothing, after all, that Skinner "taught" his famous Ping-Pong-playing pigeons that P. T. Barnum didn't teach his bears and elephants almost a century before. The importance of the Skinnerian outlook is that it extended the ideology of behavior control from "scientific management" in factories to schools, hospitals, and other institutions and—if he is to have his way—to the society at large. His success—his position as the preeminent American psychologist of the past generation—therefore testified not to the originality or power of his methods but to the receptivity of intellectuals, bureaucrats, and others to an ideology that was shaped out of the demise of the "frontier" more than a half-century ago.

What made it appealing is that in a social service system as thoroughly bureaucratized as ours, behavior modification is an almost perfect bureaucratic device—a system of points, ranks, scales, and levels almost identical to the bureaucratic apparatus itself—a civil service system for the clients. And since it works best on clients over whom the behaviorist already has extensive control—works better on prisoners, for example, than on free citizens, better on children than on adults—it invariably reinforces the extensive bureaucratic tendency to "institutionalize" the clients of social service. In the behaviorist's view, the whole culture is a factory, a madhouse, or a prison. And that, of course, is an outlook not altogether unfamiliar to those who sit in the bureaus planning our new frontiers of the future. ❑

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

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FRANCE'S NEW FOREIGN LEGIONS

By STEPHEN TALBOT

WHAT FOREIGN POWER has intervened over the past year in three African wars, maintains troops or military advisers in 17 African countries, and is aggressively pursuing a new policy of expanding its political and economic influence throughout the continent? The United States? Irrepressible Cuba? The Soviet Union? China, perhaps? *Non, c'est la France!* The veteran colonial power, whose Foreign Legion once roamed over four million square miles of French African territory, is again boldly asserting itself in African affairs—to the delight of the Carter administration.

Cuba may get the headlines, but la belle France is the most active foreign military power in Africa.

France has a formidable, and growing, military presence in Africa. According to the latest available figures, 12,500 French soldiers are stationed in five African countries and two nearby Indian Ocean islands. Backing up these troops is a mobile *force d'intervention* with a forward element in Senegal and a larger unit (the 11th parachute division) poised in southern France. The French troops in Senegal were reinforced late last year in preparation for a threatened intervention against leftist guerrillas in the nearby Western Sahara. The *Los Angeles Times* recently quoted Western intelligence sources as saying that French forces in Africa "could take and hold—for at least a day, until reinforcements arrive—any capital in the former French colonies of West Africa."

The French are also major arms dealers in Africa. Although the French government now says it will abide by the new UN Security Council's mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, for more than a decade France has been the apartheid regime's main source of modern weapons, supplying it with Mirage jet fighters, 'Alouette helicopters, Panhard armored cars, Cactus ground-to-air missiles, and Daphne submarines. France also has a booming arms trade in the rest of Africa. Morocco, for example, has just placed an order for 25 Mirage jets; Gabon wants five simplified versions of the Mirage; and the Ivory Coast and Togo have just bought 11 Alpha jet trainers, which France manufactures with West Germany.

Of interest to Americans in all this is that France—with its military clout and arms sales—has suddenly emerged as the United States's "strongest ally in Africa," according to State Department officials. President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing may still bristle at U.S. dominance in Western Europe, but in Africa, French policy has converged with U.S. interests to such an extent that Paris at times seems to have assumed the role of an American surrogate. France, commented a recent issue of *Le Monde*, is rapidly becoming "the West's policeman in Africa"—from conducting bombing raids against the Polisario guerrillas in the Western Sahara to intervening covertly in Angola. Three recent incidents—in Zaire, the Western Sahara, and South Africa—illustrate the new Franco-American partnership.

LAST MARCH, ZAIRE'S President Mobutu Sese Seko was in trouble. The country was precariously close to bankruptcy, Mobutu could not muster a convincing display of popular support in his own capital, and rebels in Shaba province were closing in on the copper mining center of Kolwezi—the heart of Zaire's economy. The rebels, who had entered Shaba from exile in Angola, were being welcomed by the local population, which had long resented Mobutu's rule. Mobutu's notoriously inept army was retreating in embarrassing disarray, and the small rebel force was, in the words of one Western diplomat on the scene, cutting through Shaba "like a knife through butter." Insisting that "as long as I live, we shall conquer," Mobutu—who calls himself "the Guide"—immediately appealed to Washington for emergency assistance, presenting the Carter administration with the first real test of its Africa policy. Although Mobutu had been cited in a 1976 State Department report for repeated violations of human rights, he had every reason to expect aid from the United States. He had taken power in 1965 with the active support of the CIA, and Henry Kissinger had considered him Washington's most important ally among black African leaders. The United States also had a substantial economic stake to preserve in Zaire: nearly $1 billion in direct investments and more than $500 million in bank loans. Citibank, Chase Manhattan, and other Wall Street power-brokers were particularly concerned that Zaire not default on its estimated $3 billion foreign debt—setting a precedent that other debt-ridden Third World countries might be tempted to follow.

In this post-Vietnam War era, however, there were limits to what Carter could do for an old client like Mobutu. Congress would certainly not tolerate dispatching troops to Zaire. And

STEPHEN TALBOT reports on Africa for the International Bulletin.

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Mobutu's general reputation as a repressive, autocratic leader made it difficult for the Carter administration—just launching its human rights campaign—to justify large-scale arms shipments to Mobutu. Key figures in Congress, including Senator Dick Clark (D.-Ia.) who heads the Senate subcommittee on Africa, argued that the administration should exercise great restraint in supporting "an unpopular and thoroughly corrupt dictator" like Mobutu.

Improvising under these restrictions, the Carter administration decided to encourage and support other countries—both Western and Third World—to intervene on Mobutu's behalf. To Washington's relief, France acted quickly and decisively, airlifting 1500 Moroccan troops to put down the Shaba rebellion. Proclaiming a policy of "Africa for the Africans," Giscard assumed the burden of safeguarding the substantial Western economic and strategic interests in Zaire. The French-Moroccan intervention (with Belgium, Egypt, the United States, Saudi Arabia, China, and Uganda playing supporting roles) saved the day for Mobutu. A grateful Carter administration was able to avoid a confrontation with an intervention-shy Congress and limit its overt participation to $15 million in "nonlethal" military aid to Mobutu.

With Gaullist pride, Giscard denies that he was responding to a request from Washington. However, the facts suggest otherwise. Just before ordering the French airlift and sending in French military advisers to coordinate the ground fighting, he held special talks with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The *Washington Post* noted at the time that "there is widespread belief, or suspicion, that the United States 'masterminded' the strategy used in Zaire," and remarked that Carter administration officials were "quite pleased with themselves" and with the French intervention. There is therefore a strong likelihood that France coordinated its intervention with Washington. France has a history of working with the United States in the region: France, for example, was a quiet but deeply involved participant in the U.S.-sponsored effort to promote the pro-Western factions in Angola against the leftist MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola). The U.S.-French intervention in Angola was largely organized out of Zaire's capital, Kinshasa. But whether or not France was responding to an American directive, the Carter administration could not have been more satisfied with the French action.

*SIMILARLY, IN THE WEST*ern Sahara, the United States has welcomed France's escalating support for Morocco and Mauritania in their war against the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas. Although officially neutral in the desert conflict, Washington is clearly partial to Morocco's staunchly anti-Communist King Hassan II. U.S. military aid to Morocco climbed from $8.6 million in 1974 to $45 million (including a squadron of F-5 jets) in fiscal year 1978 as King Hassan became increasingly embroiled in the war for control of the phosphate-rich Sahara. Now the Carter administration is lobbying Congress to approve sales of 24 OV-10 armed reconnaissance planes and 24 Cobra helicopter gunships. Direct intervention on behalf of Morocco, however, would be risky for Washington and out of the question politically. But the French are under no such restraints.

In addition to being Morocco's number-one supplier of weapons, France has armed, trained, and reorganized the military forces of Morocco's ally, Mauritania, and has sent French Jaguar fighter-bombers into action against Polisario guerrillas. Last December, while the guerrillas were holding eight French hostages, Paris refused to confirm or deny Polisario's reports of French bombing raids. But as soon as the hostages were released December 23, Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud acknowledged that French planes had flown reconnaissance missions over the Sahara and strafed Polisario convoys, although he denied the guerrillas' charge that napalm and phosphorous bombs had been dropped. The French government also issued a statement saying that French aircraft were likely to be used again "to protect our nationals in Mauritania and at the request of the Mauritanian authorities."

The Carter administration is sympathetic to Morocco and is not anxious to see Algerian-backed guerrillas establish a leftist "Democratic Saharan Arab Republic" in territory that Morocco has annexed. Washington quietly approved the 1975 agreement under which Spain transferred its former Saharan colony to Morocco and Mauritania, despite the fact that—as called for by the United Nations—no referendum had been held in the territory to determine the preference of the local inhabitants. Polisario, formed in 1973 to fight for national independence, contends there is majority sentiment for that position, and there is significant evidence to support their claim: Some 100,000 Saharan residents have fled Moroccan occupation and are now living under harsh conditions in Polisario-run refugee camps near the Algerian border town of Tindouf. An estimated 10,000–20,000 have joined the Polisario guerrilla forces.

Last spring, Polisario's Foreign Minister Brahim Hakim Adel was rebuffed when he came to the United States to seek the support of the Carter administration. Carter officials prefer their low-profile support for pro-Western Morocco, and they can rest assured that France will continue to shoulder the burden of direct intervention on behalf of Morocco and Mauritania against Polisario guerrillas.

Giscard told a New Year's press conference in Paris that he believed France had saved Zaire and Mauritania (the target of most Polisario attacks) from collapse in 1977. He stressed what he termed the necessity for the West to take similar actions to counter "destabilization" in Africa and said he would discuss this with President Carter during his visit. Of course, in Giscard's political vocabulary, "destabilization" refers not to covert CIA operations but to Soviet activity or to independent leftist movements that challenge existing African regimes. Giscard said he thought the United States was not yet sufficiently concerned about the threat of "destabilization" in Africa, but he noted that the United States and France had broad political agreement on policy for Africa.

A THIRD AREA OF POLICY in which Paris and Washington have recently cooperated concerns South Africa. The issue there has been how much pressure to put on Prime Minister John Vorster's regime to change the apartheid system. At the UN, the United States, Britain, and France teamed up to cast a triple veto last fall against an African-sponsored resolution calling for economic sanctions against South Africa. The Western powers—with their vast financial investments and interests in South Africa's strategic minerals—were not about to support such a reso-

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lution. But the Carter administration, in particular, was anxious to demonstrate the West's greater willingness to put pressure on Vorster in the wake of the Soweto uprising and the white-minority regime's massive political crackdown last October. To demonstrate its new policy toward South Africa, the Carter administration decided to support a Security Council order for a mandatory arms embargo. One problem, however, was France. Could the French be convinced to go along with the United States and Britain in an arms boycott?

France—the third largest arms-dealer in the world—had a lucrative weapons business going with South Africa, in spite of earlier UN appeals for a voluntary arms embargo. If the current arms sanctions have come too late to curb South Africa's military might, France is in large part responsible, although most Western powers (including the United States) must share the blame. Between 1970 and 1975, France poured an estimated $400 million worth of arms into South Africa—much of it advanced, sophisticated weaponry. One reason the French continued to sell arms to South Africa, despite a good deal of international condemnation, is that the arms industry is extremely important to the French economy. In 1974, France netted almost $5 billion through arms sales. The weapons industry, one of the country's biggest, employs 270,000 workers and brings in substantial foreign currencies. Part of South Africa's payments for French arms came in the form of discreet shipments of gold to the Banque de France.

The French, predictably, were not in favor of a mandatory arms embargo. Nevertheless, in a series of intense, behind-the-scenes negotiating sessions at the UN with Andrew Young and the British, the French were persuaded that an arms cutoff was necessary—if for no other reason than to draw the line and reject the more radical move, namely, an economic embargo.

Besides there were compensating factors for the French. Cutting off arms sales to Johannesburg could open up new markets for French weapons in black Africa and the Middle East. Realizing this earlier, the French government had itself announced three successive, partial arms embargoes against South Africa since 1975 in an effort to improve its image and expand its markets. However, each announcement had been greeted with a certain amount of skepticism in Africa because major exceptions and loopholes were always included. In the last of its own announced embargoes, for instance, France said it would still deliver two Agosta-class attack submarines and two destroyer escorts already on order.

Now with the mandatory UN embargo, France has had to cancel delivery of these warships—an important step. (However, there is still a loophole: France has made no move to stop production in South Africa of French weapons—including Mirage jets—under licensing agreements with French companies. The new UN embargo calls only for countries to "review" their existing licensing agreements with South Africa—a loophole which a leading South African military expert told the *Johannesburg Citizen* he thinks South Africa can exploit.) The French can console themselves with the fact they are already selling arms to some 20 African countries.

The French campaign for influence throughout the continent has been hampered by Paris's close ties with the South African regime.

Supporting the mandatory arms embargo—a move welcomed by Carter—could also improve France's bid for wider influence in Africa. France, which exercises tremendous influence and economic power in most of its former African colonies, has made some notable inroads in the more pro-Western English-speaking countries—opening a Renault assembly plant in Nigeria and a dazzling cultural center in Kenya. But the French campaign for influence throughout the continent has been hampered by Paris's close ties with South Africa. Last August, on a tour of mainly East African, English-speaking countries, French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud arrived in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to face a vociferous but nonviolent demonstration by about 200 students protesting French arms sales to South Africa. When the Tanzanian government declined to halt the demonstration and refused to apologize, de Guiringaud left in a huff for Paris. The next day, Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere expressed his support for the student demonstrators, saying, "France, of all the Western countries, is now the biggest supporter of racism in southern Africa." Nyerere described France as "arrogant, defiant, and mercantile in its relations with Africa." The relatively moderate, government-owned *Daily Mail* of Zambia concurred with Nyerere's assessment of France and said that de Guiringaud's "intemperance and impatience" in canceling his Tanzanian visit had done "more harm to the French government in its relations with black Africa." French support for the new UN arms embargo will not guarantee French access to previously hostile or suspicious African countries, but it does remove a major obstacle to improved relations.

IF ZAIRE, THE WESTERN SAhara, and South Africa all provide examples of the emergence of a Franco-American alliance in Africa, it must also be said that France is intent on expanding its own power and influence. (Although, here again, this does not generally conflict with Washington's goals, since the United States prefers any form of Western hegemony in Africa to Soviet or Cuban influence, or to the development of nonaligned, leftist nations like Mozambique.)

After intervening last spring in Zaire, France convened in Dakar, Senegal, a special summit conference of 22 African countries, most of them French-speaking. Giscard affirmed their "right to security" and told them France would help resist any foreign invasion of a "friendly" African nation. The French president let it be known his country's intervention in Zaire was an example of what Paris considers its "special mission" in Africa—not just a one-time gesture.

A recent issue of the moderate French news magazine *Jeune Afrique* reported that French troops are still stationed in Djibouti (4500 men), Senegal (1200), the Ivory Coast (400), Chad (400), and Gabon (450). Some sources list higher figures: The *New York Times,* for example, reports that 6500 troops have remained in tiny Djibouti after that outpost—the last French colony on the African mainland—became independent last June.

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Jeune Afrique says there are almost 4000 French military personnel on two Indian Ocean islands, Mayotte and Réunion, both fallback positions after France withdrew from Madagascar (now the Malagasy Republic) in 1973. The 15 French warships permanently assigned to Mayotte and Réunion have been reinforced since 1974 by the aircraft carrier *Clemenceau*, the frigate *Tourville*, the destroyer *Bouvet*, and two fuel tankers.

The French fleet patrols the western Indian Ocean, the East African coast, and the Cape of Good Hope—docking at a dozen or so tiny French-administered islands. The warships and the island bases are strategically located around the Mozambique Channel, which is the prime passageway for oil tankers sailing from the Persian Gulf around the Cape to the Atlantic and on to Western Europe and the United States.

To fortify their military position along the East African coast, the French, according to *Jeune Afrique*, want to install an advanced missile system at their base in Djibouti. This base is of enormous strategic value, guarding, as it does, the entrance to the Red Sea, overlooking a vital oil route, and monitoring ships as they cross the Indian Ocean. In conjunction with the $173 million U.S. naval and air base on Diego Garcia island and the French island bases, Djibouti gives the Western powers a strategic edge over the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean—especially now that the Soviets have been expelled from Somalia and no longer have access to their military facility at Berbera.

The French have bolstered their military presence in Africa not only to play the role of the West's policeman and extend their political influence, but to guard their own particular economic interests. France has billions of dollars invested in French-speaking Africa and a two-way trade with the continent that totaled $8 billion in 1976. Hundreds of thousands of French nationals continue to live and work in the former colonies, including 9000 French Peace Corps-style volunteers. French aid to Africa—concentrated in Francophone countries—reached $800 million last year.

France's closest and oldest economic ties are with former colonies like Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Gabon, where France has nurtured and sustained conservative, exceedingly pro-French regimes. In general, French military intervention in Africa in the postcolonial period has been to maintain these neocolonialist governments. In 1962, for example, the French army reestablished control after a tentative coup in Dakar, Senegal. Two years later, French paratroopers were flown into Gabon to reverse a military coup rumored to have been inspired by American interests seeking to break the virtual French monopoly over Gabon's wealth of natural resources—oil, timber, manganese, and uranium. During last year's OAU conference in Gabon, President Omar Bongo entrusted the security arrangements to French police!

FROM 1968 UNTIL THE MID-seventies, as many as 6000 French troops were involved in a major counterinsurgency campaign, bolstering the government of Chad against Libyan-backed rebels in Chad's remote northern desert region. The rebels were never eliminated, however, and when fighting flared again last summer, French military transport planes flew Chad army units into the battle areas and supplied ammunition, vehicles, and spare parts. The guerrilla insurgency, led by the Chad National Liberation Front (Frolinat), is still continuing in the bleak landscape of the Tibesti mountains (which may contain uranium), and the shaky regime of General Felix Malloum remains dependent on French military and economic aid.

In addition to French interventions last year in Zaire, Chad, and the Western Sahara, there were charges of French involvement in an attempted coup against the leftist government of Benin in January 1976 and in a plot with Zaire, South Africa, and the United States to invade Angola. The abortive coup in Benin (formerly Dahomey) involved between 80 and 100 mercenaries—half were white—who were airlifted into the national airport in an unmarked plane. After a three-hour gun battle, the invaders withdrew, leaving behind assorted Western-manufactured weapons. The UN Security Council condemned the "armed aggression" without blaming any country. Benin accused "French imperialists" of planning the raid in collaboration with Morocco and Gabon.

As far back as 1975, Giscard expressed a special interest in Angola, telling a Franco-African summit meeting that he looked forward to the emergence of a new grouping of African countries—including former French, Belgian, and *Portuguese* colonies. The proposal for ex-Portuguese colonies—what Giscard called "Latin African" states—to join the Paris-dominated French-speaking bloc coincided with stepped-up covert French military involvement in Angola, the largest and richest of the former Portuguese colonies.

The French intelligence agency, SDECE, collaborated with the CIA in channeling weapons, mercenaries, and money to FNLA and UNITA, according to a wide variety of sources ranging from the *Washington Post* to the centrist French weekly *Nouvel Observateur* to ex-CIA agent Philip Agee. *Nouvel Observateur* reported in early 1976 that the French government had not only cooperated with the CIA in Angola, but had pursued independently its own particular interest in UNITA's Swiss-educated leader, Jonas Savimbi. The French weekly stated that Savimbi had been received several times at the Elysée, the French presidential palace. Philip Agee, in January 1976, said he believed Paris had become the center of operations for Western efforts to try to salvage the flagging FNLA-UNITA alliance.

The French-American intervention in Angola, even when reinforced by South African troops, was not sufficient to defeat the Cuban- and Soviet-backed MPLA government. But the loss in Angola has clearly not dissuaded France and the United States from stepping up their involvement in other parts of Africa, as the interventions in Zaire and the Western Sahara clearly indicate. Although the French know well the dangers of involvement in Third World nations—the wars in Indochina and Algeria drained France's strength and produced domestic political turmoil—for now, France seems to be willing to assume the risks of direct intervention in these countries on behalf of its own interests and those of the West.

But French military activity in Africa carries risks for the United States, too. Military interventions of any sort in Africa can quickly escalate into larger conflicts. Having given its tacit approval to French military intervention in Africa, the United States may someday have to decide whether to rescue France, as it did in Indochina, from some ill-fated adventure. In the end, the Carter administration's policy of using the French as surrogates may drag this country into the kind of rapidly expanding African conflict most Americans want to avoid. ❑

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DROPSHOT: The American Plan for World War III Against Russia in 1957, edited by Anthony Cave Brown. Dial Press/James Wade, 330 pp., $12.95.

The habit of total war

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

DURING THE PAST FEW years the Department of Defense has declassified more than 50,000 pages of war plans, prepared in 1945–1952, for retaliation against possible Soviet attacks on Western Europe, the Middle East, the Far East, and ultimately the United States. From this vast pile of documents, Anthony Cave Brown, a British journalist, has selected for publication one of the longest and most detailed—a 1949 plan, "Dropshot," for all-out war in 1957, contingent on a Soviet attack. Exaggerating the significance of Dropshot, he has hastily thrown in an introduction, inserted some misleading appendixes to the plan, and provided many explanatory notes, most of which accept the Cold War orthodoxy.

Dropshot, prepared shortly after the August 1949 explosion of the first Soviet A-bomb, provides familiar evidence on dominant official thinking about Soviet motives and capacity, and often reads like a rehearsal for the highly influential National Security Council Document 68 (April 1950), which offered a blueprint for winning the Cold War. The 1949 plan spoke of "strict control of world Communism by Soviet Russia" and her "ultimate objective . . . of . . . world [domination]," acknowledged that the Kremlin saw war "as the most expensive and least desirable method of [dominating the world]," but forecast that the Soviets' "increasing military potential will render the war alternative less hazardous for them." Since the plan was prepared primarily to develop future American military requirements, the authors, not surprisingly, ended by recommending a slightly larger defense budget. More restrained than Secretary of State Dean Acheson and his assistant, Paul Nitze, who were plumping for double or triple the $15 billion budgets, the Joint Chiefs of Staff modestly hoped to raise military expenditures by a few billion.

Dropshot aimed for total victory—of the kind that had been achieved over Germany and Japan—the occupation of Russia, the liberation of her European satellites, and the destruction of Communism in these areas. The planners hoped that massive strategic bombing, relying on a few hundred atomic weapons, *might* produce prompt Soviet surrender and thus make a costly land war unnecessary. Because theirs was a faint hope, however, the planners devoted most of their attention to what seemed the most likely course of events—an all-out, prolonged war, with millions of soldiers and many deaths. Even in this scenario, the

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atomic bomb was the key weapon, for it could greatly weaken the enemy's physical means of waging war and hence pave the way for an American triumph. The chief bomb targets were "facilities for the production of weapons . . . , key government and control facilities, major industrial areas, and [petroleum] sources" in the Soviet Union, as well as supply bases and troop concentrations in both the Soviet Union and the nations she had conquered or would conquer, including those of Western Europe.

Nuclear attacks, the planners acknowledged, "would create a condition of chaos and extreme confusion [and] the psychological effect, properly exploited," could be valuable. How valuable? Curiously, they did not dwell on this theme or on the number of civilian deaths. The planners comfortably accepted the concept of total war, including the definition of civilians as a legitimate target for killing: Civilians were the labor force for production, and their morale was essential to the enemy's military system and to the polity. Terrorized citizens, watching neighbors and friends die in bomb raids, might revolt or demand peace.

World War II, not the Cold War, transformed the morality of armed conflict and thus led Americans to accept total war. They did not protest, for they had become inured to the mass death of a hated enemy.

UNFORTUNATELY, BROWN is so enamored of the details of strategic plans that he overlooks or minimizes important matters that are essential to understanding the background of the 1949 plan: How had Americans come to accept total war and the military use of atomic bombs? When had a moral distinction emerged between conventional and atomic warfare? How did American leaders plan to use the atomic bomb—in diplomacy or in war—during the early postwar period? How widespread was support for preventive war?

It was World War II, not the Cold War, that transformed the morality of armed conflict and thus led Americans to accept total war. By 1945, as a result, they enthusiastically welcomed the fire-bombings of Tokyo and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Some even called for "killing more Japs," and few, aside from a maverick like Dwight Macdonald, sharply criticized total war and nuclear attacks.

Americans did not know that Henry L. Stimson, the secretary of war, had been deeply troubled by America's conduct of total war. In his unpublished diary, Stimson had confided how much he abhorred America's bombing of enemy civilians, and paradoxically—since he had himself sanctioned these attacks—he also lamented the moral insensitivity of Americans. They did not protest, he complained, for they were inured to the mass death of a hated enemy. Here Stimson was not manifesting hypocrisy but a tortured conscience torn between an older conception of morality, which he defined as essential to civilization, and a new morality, which advisers told him was essential to save Allied lives and speed the end of the hated war.

Seldom could Stimson bring himself to focus clearly on this conflict. Rather, he moved from decision to decision, from crisis to crisis, and in the rush slipped into contradictions that he did not recognize. On June 6, 1945, for example, he told Truman: "I was trying to hold the Air Force down to precision-bombing [of Japan] first, because I did not want to have the United States get the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities; and second, I was a little fearful that before we could get ready, the Air Force might have Japan so thoroughly bombed out that the [atomic bomb] would not have a fair background to show its strength."

At the time of Hiroshima, military leaders feared that the bombing might provoke great moral outrage in America. The day after the first atomic attack, General Carl Spaatz, commanding general of the strategic air force in the Pacific, cabled the Pentagon, ". . . the accuracy with which [the Hiroshima] bomb was placed may counter a thought that the project was wanton, indiscriminate bombing." Yet, the actual purpose was indeed mass death and great destruction, as the recently declassified Interim Committee minutes for May 31, 1945, make clear: ". . . we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many inhabitants as possible [and therefore] the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses." The explosion, J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, had forecast, would be lethal "for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile," and would probably kill about 20,000–30,000 Japanese.

The president's announcement following the attack simply called Hiroshima "an important Japanese army base" and omitted any mention of the thousands of civilian deaths. Consistent with this strategy, the army minimized the number killed by radiation and after the surrender even briefly barred reporters from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Pentagon also suppressed the evidence, confirmed by Japanese authorities, of the American POWs killed by the Hiroshima bomb.

TRUMAN NEVER QUES- tioned the morality or necessity of the first two atomic bombings, but he was anxious to avoid using a third bomb in the last days of the Pacific war. On August 10, after Japan offered a conditional surrender, the president told his cabinet, according to one member's diary: ". . . the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He didn't like the idea of killing . . . 'all those kids.' " Truman explained that he would halt the use of atomic bombs but continue conventional attacks. Why this distinction where none had existed before for him? Probably the magnitude of the number of deaths from a single bomb was at the root of his moral distinction. In addition, it is likely there was a political dimension, for he and some advisers assumed that American citizens would also condemn another nuclear attack. American leaders were wrong, as some polls later revealed. The sacrifices demanded by war, together with the government's propaganda, had helped persuade Americans (as Stimson had lamented) of the legitimacy of total war, including repeated atomic attacks against a hated enemy—Japan.

The American people did not hate Russia in 1945–1946, nor did they want war. Truman knew that he could not use the bomb as a weapon against Russia—except to defend America, which Soviet forces could not reach, or to retaliate for a Soviet attack on Western Europe. In 1945–1946, as the Cold

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War publicly erupted on the issues of Eastern Europe, Americans would not have tolerated war to liberate this area from Soviet dominance.

But American leaders expected that their mere possession of the atomic bomb might constitute an implied threat and hence render the Soviets more tractable on Eastern Europe and other matters. Stimson, for example, complained that Secretary of State James F. Byrnes was using the bomb as an "implied threat" in dealing with the Soviets, thus hoping to force concessions. Byrnes's strategy, much to his distress, did not yield American victories, probably because the Soviets feared that concessions would only encourage American boldness and invite greater demands.

Compelled by citizens to "bring the boys home" and to demobilize conventional forces rapidly after V-J Day, the administration came to rely primarily upon the bomb for military power.

Shortly after Hiroshima, the Pentagon began preparing a plan for atomic attacks on the 20 "most suitable targets" in the Soviet Union, in the event of war.

Ten weeks after Hiroshima, a Pentagon committee began preparing a plan for nuclear attacks on the 20 "most suitable Soviet targets." That plan, recently declassified, chose only cities (including Moscow and Leningrad), selecting them on the basis of their importance for industrial production, government operations, or scientific research. These 20 cities, with a total population of about 15 million, produced most of the aircraft, guns, tanks, trucks, and refined oil—the sinews of war.

Most planners of 1945–1946, unlike those of 1949, did not have even a faint hope that atomic bombs would immediately end a war with the Soviet Union. They did expect that the bombings would weaken the enemy and speed victory by pulverizing the Kremlin and destroying vital parts of the Soviet economy. Many of the residents of the Soviet cities were expected to die in the attacks, but planners did not emphasize the A-bomb as a terror weapon that would destroy morale. Nor, unlike the 1949 planners, did those in 1945 believe that the A-bomb could be employed against ground troops in Western Europe.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1945 analysis were unnerving to American military leaders: The atomic bomb was not an omnipotent, but a very limited, weapon. It might deter war, but it could not *alone* defeat the Soviet Union. If the Soviets attacked Western Europe or the Middle East, to cite the two key areas, American war planners acknowledged that these lands might be lost for as along as two years. Such pessimistic counsel conflicted sharply with popular beliefs that the A-bomb was the absolute weapon.

In 1945–1949, American leaders did not expect Soviet aggression against Europe in the near future, and they knew that the Soviets lacked the navy or long-range air force to threaten the United States. Perhaps for these reasons there were few who urged preventive war. During the war, Arthur H. Compton, the Nobel physicist and Manhattan Project official, had been virtually alone in suggesting that the United States drop an atomic bomb on the Soviet Union to make her roll back the barriers of secrecy. After the war, James Forrestal, the first secretary of defense, flirted with the notions of preventive war, and his successor Louis Johnson, as well as Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews, advocated this strategy. Such counsel encountered hostility within the administration. American leaders, despite some fears, believed that the future could be on their side: Both Dropshot and National Security Council Document 68 were part of the continuing process by which they assessed Soviet and American power and then called for greater defense spending. They all agreed on Soviet malevolence, but believed that American will would triumph. The critical issues, for most, were the appropriate price of military preparedness, the likely cost of victory, the proper mode for blocking Third World revolution, and whether sufficient American power might deter all-out war long enough for the Soviet Union to crumble while the American system endured and even flourished. ❏

UNMAILABLE: Congress and the Post Office, by Dorothy Ganfield Fowler. University of Georgia Press, 266 pp., $14.50.

Uncertified mail

WILLIAM C. WOOLDRIDGE

THE STORY OF THE U.S. POST Office is a feature-length cartoon of American political history. The burning issues of the day have always reached the Post Office, and have there been reduced to caricature by becoming the object of the petty bureaucratic mind. In retrospect, we must resemble the Finns, who recently banned Donald Duck from children's libraries because of his common-law marriage, nudity, and bourgeois attitudes toward work and money. With a little power over what other people read, men with deeply held convictions will usually stage a farce.

Unmailable is a straight-faced legislative history of restrictions on what may be deposited in the United States mail. The interest of the subject does not lie in the intrinsic fascination of postal code classifications but in the highly focused treatment of various views of the proper uses of a government service, and it is remarkable how often these views come down to the same consensus: Material that the majority finds disagreeable ought not to be disseminated through the government mail.

The first example of a mailability restriction, going back to 1797, already had a comic character. Letters were getting gooey. The culprits were newspaper publishers, who mailed off their papers quite literally before the ink was dry, turning the contents of the nation's mailbags into soggy masses. Congress considered a proposal allowing only dry newspapers in the mails, the forerunner, Fowler shows, of all the laws excluding undesirable material from the mails for the next 150 years. But unlike the restrictions that were to come, avowedly aimed at the content of communications, the dry paper law sought only to

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protect the mechanical side of mail distribution. Yet some congressmen objected strenuously to the idea, fearing to entrust local postmasters with the power to decide which papers were wet and which were dry. The law was enacted by a narrow vote.

WITHIN A FEW YEARS, eighteenth century concern over the perils of the administrative exercise of discretion seemed well taken. When abolitionists began to use the Post Office to circulate their literature, demands immediately arose for the removal of this incendiary and seditious material from the mails. The Post Office piously disclaimed the right to "exclude newspapers from the mail . . . on account of their character or tendency, real or supposed." However, the same end was achieved through a policy of letting individual postmasters do as they pleased with abolitionist tracts. To legitimize this policy, President Jackson in 1835 sought a statute barring abolitionist material from the mails. John C. Calhoun rejected Jackson's approach on states' rights grounds. His committee report also asserted that Congress could not use its control over the Post Office to limit freedom of the press, since to do so would violate the First Amendment. Instead, Congress should simply close the Post Office to antislavery material in states that prohibited its circulation! Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, Thomas Hart Benton, and others debated these issues for a week. In the end, no bill passed. Right up until the outbreak of the Civil War, postmasters continued to act on their own judgment. In Lynchberg, Virginia, for example, Postmaster Robert H. Glass would not deliver the *New York Tribune.*

The Civil War developed a new censorship, initially grounded on nothing more than the postmaster general's decision to exclude disloyal papers from the mail. Exclusion suppressed a paper as effectively as direct censorship, for no other means of general circulation were available. With poetic justice the practice of refusing use of the Post Office to "seditious" abolitionist papers was cited as precedent for action against the more current form of sedition: opposition to the use of force against the South.



JIM MURPHY

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Post Office's attention was occupied by lotteries, fraud—and obscenity. Anthony Comstock became a special postal agent and scoured the country for offensive material. Among other activities, he successfully lobbied for a law excluding information about birth control from the mails; it stayed on the books almost a hundred years.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, A man who was sure enough of his convictions to think the government should enforce them wherever possible, wanted to exclude from the mails "anarchistic opinions" and the "disgusting details" of murders and divorces. Congressmen drew an analogy between the futures market and a lottery, and tried to block speculators' access to the Post Office (in fact, the federal securities laws of the 1930s were based in part on Congress's power over the Post Office). While nothing came of these particular initiatives, Fowler points out that at the time when people still thought the interstate commerce power related to interstate commerce, the Post Office power became a convenient base for a whole series of forays into federal criminal law. (For example, concealable firearms were made nonmailable in 1927, and even information on the availability of foreign divorces was interdicted in 1939.) Whenever administrators and legislators felt strongly enough on a subject, they were more than willing to use the postal power as a substitute for the general federal police power they did not possess. Even before the Eighteenth Amendment, newspapers with liquor advertisements could not be mailed in dry states; the bootstrap reliance on state law recalls the attempted interdiction of abolitionist papers in states where they were illegal.

About 60 Socialist papers lost their second-class mailing privileges in World War I; Postmaster General Burleson would not brook criticism of the draft, of the sale of government bonds, or of the collection of taxes. When President Wilson intervened on behalf of *Masses,* Burleson faced him down; a more detailed look at him and some other individuals who figured prominently in executing postal policies would have been worthwhile.

IN OUR OWN TIMES RESTRIC- tions were placed on the dissemination of Communist propaganda, then dropped as a result of a Supreme Court ruling. Better-known cases concerned obscenity in the mails: the attempts to ban the distribution of *Esquire, Lady Chatterley's Lover,* and, on an appropriate note of buffoonery, 2000 reproductions of Goya's *Naked Maja.* (The prohibition on mailing obscene materials remains a law; it may surprise laymen that so much of the constitutional litigation over obscenity and the First Amendment grows out of a Post Office statute.) These disputes have been elaborately analyzed elsewhere; Fowler's contribution is to relate them to the long and enduring tradition of postal censorship.

A strand running through the whole story of use of postal powers for purposes other than facilitating communications is impatience with judicial remedies and a preference for the efficiency

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and effectiveness of administrative fiat in suppressing whatever mortal danger to the republic loomed largest at the time. The courts have on the whole come out reasonably well in their periodic efforts to stop Post Office bureaucrats from acting as the arbiters of the politics and morals of American society. The story is not one of ever greater impositions on freedom of the press, but rather of regular and repeated strikes at political and social minorities, strikes which were predictable—given the status of the Post Office as a branch of the government—and which the postal authorities were often at a later date compelled to rescind.

The author's sources are primarily legislative history and court cases, with the result that the account is a straightforward monograph that some readers would find dry. Where Fowler has incorporated a larger amount of secondary material, as in the chapter on the abolitionists (perhaps the best in the book), the narrative is more fully rounded and of wider interest. She is entirely aware of, and frequently alludes to, the broader implications of the subject, but hews close to the legislative trail in presenting it. Within these intentional confines, the book lays out clearly the development of the power to exclude material from the mails, as often as not to thwart some victimless crime, like the sale of birth-control devices, Mexican divorces, or pornography. The book's design (for which no credit is given) is also engaging. For example, *Unmailable* comes jacketed in a plain brown wrapper.

THE POST OFFICE'S LOONY tunes are of more than antiquarian interest. In recent years a curious reenactment of Post Office history has taken place at the Federal Communications Commission. The airwaves, like the Post Office, are conceived to be a mode of communication that belongs to "the public." Again and again the agency in charge has succumbed to the temptation to regulate and restrict such communication for some good cause, sometimes seeking legislative authorization after the fact, if at all. This very term the FCC is trying to persuade the Supreme Court to recognize its right to prohibit unsavory language that may fall short of the legal definition of obscenity. The FCC continues to struggle with obscenity, the "fairness doctrine," prime-time programming restrictions, family viewing hours, and the insidious merchandising of presweetened cereal by cartoon heroes. In the abstract, everyone agrees that the content of communication is not the proper concern of the government, but for many, the principle must be abandoned in the face of concrete evils like abolitionism and tooth decay.

The advent of cable television has presented the old temptation in still another guise. There is already an abundance of commentators who are demanding that this new medium be somehow harnessed to "the public interest." Advocating various FCC controls, one law professor has emphasized cable television's unique capabilities: If properly handled, "government can reach the individual and the individual can reach government"—on reflection, a truly sinister goal for a country's channels of communication. *Unmailable* should make it hard to forget that no matter how neutral we may wish a government service to be, time and circumstances will regularly turn it into a vehicle that any zealot with a passing political majority can use to promote his own vision of the good. ❏

THE "CONFESSION" OF MIKHAIL BAKUNIN, edited by Robert C. Howes and Lawrence D. Orton.
Cornell University Press, 200 pp., $12.50.

Tenacious myths

NICOLAS WALTER

BAKUNIN WAS ONE OF THE best-known revolutionaries of the nineteenth century, and the *Confession* is one of his best-known works. But most of what has been said about him in general, or about this work in particular, shows only how little what is said by men of letters has to do with what is done by men of action.

Bakunin was born in 1814 into a noble Russian family, and was destined for the army. But, abandoning his family, his career, his class, and his country, he emigrated to Western Europe in 1840. First he theorized about rebellion in Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and France, for which he was sentenced in his absence to loss of title and estate, and to exile in Siberia; then he practiced revolution during the upheavals of 1848–1849 in France, Germany, and Austria, for which he was imprisoned and exiled for 12 years. After being arrested in 1849, he was twice interrogated, tried, condemned to death, reprieved, and deported—first in Saxony, then in Austria—and in 1851 he was returned to Russia.

After a couple of months in the Peter and Paul fortress in St. Petersburg, he was invited by the head of the political police to write a confession of his revolutionary activity for Czar Nicholas I. He did so, but it gained him only permission to correspond with, and to be visited by, his family; he was not granted exile in Siberia until 1857, after Nicholas had been succeeded by Alexander II. Bakunin escaped from Siberia in 1861, and resumed his revolutionary activity in Western Europe, which he continued until just before his death in Switzerland in 1876.

The *Confession* seems to have been used by the Czarist government to damage Bakunin's reputation in the revolutionary movement at least once in his lifetime, but it remained inaccessible in the police archives for more than half a century, until the 1917 revolution. It remained unpublished for some time even then, appearing in part in 1919 and in full in 1921, when it was also used by the Marxists to damage Bakunin's reputation in the revolutionary movement. The authoritative Russian edition was published in 1936, and translations appeared in several languages. The present book represents the first English translation, by Robert C. Howes, with introduction and notes by Lawrence D. Orton. There is certainly no need to do the job again, and this elegant (and rather expensive) addition to the literature of the revolutionary movement is welcome; but it is not perfect.

The most obvious defect (apart from the heavy-handed style both of the translation and of the editorial apparatus) is that the *Confession* doesn't stand alone; it should really be read in conjunction with Bakunin's other prison writings—the letters and diaries written in Saxony and Austria, the letters written to his family in Russia, and the

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KAROL KOTAS

successful petition to Alexander II. Orton mentions and quotes from some of these items, but it would have been better if Howes had translated them in full. A more serious defect, however, is that Orton repeats several myths about Bakunin and his *Confession* which have falsified his reputation for a century.

THE FIRST MYTH IS THAT Bakunin broke a revolutionary rule by which Russian political prisoners didn't make statements to the authorities. In fact, before Bakunin such statements were made by nearly all the Decembrists in 1826 and by the Petrashevsky circle in 1849; and after Bakunin such statements were made by the Nechayev circle in 1870–1873, by some of the successful assassins of Alexander II in 1881, by most of the unsuccessful assassins of Alexander III in 1883 and 1887, and by several later assassins in 1904–1906. Few of even the bravest prisoners resisted interrogation for long, and Bakunin was following rather than breaking a rule; more important, he didn't implicate other prisoners, as did so many of his predecessors and successors.

The second myth is that there is a mystery about Bakunin's motives in writing the *Confession*. Orton takes this problem seriously, but it is obvious that Bakunin wrote it because it was his only chance of improving his desperate situation. The third myth is that there is a mystery about Bakunin's tone in the *Confession*. Orton takes this problem seriously, too, but again it is obvious that Bakunin's submission to Nicholas was hypocritical; this is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the quite different tone of the letters he managed to smuggle to his sister Tatiana in 1854. A century later, when revolutionaries in the East have made public confession of absurd crimes part of Communist orthodoxy, and when revolutionaries in the West have made public conversion to absurd cults part of radical chic, it should also be obvious that rich and comfortable commentators have no right from their studies to criticize an isolated and helpless prisoner for doing virtually anything to get out of his cell.

It was only in the last decade of his life that Bakunin abandoned insurrection and attached himself to the libertarian (or anarchist) wing of the socialist movement.

A final myth is that Bakunin was the representative of anarchism and that the *Confession* is an expression of anarchism. In fact there was no such thing as the anarchist movement in 1851, or for many years to come. It was only in the last decade of his life that Bakunin abandoned nationalist and populist insurrection against the Hapsburg and Romanov empires and attached himself to the libertarian wing of the socialist movement, which in the 1870s became known as anarchist. It is true that some of the particular features of Bakunin's version of anarchism already appear in the *Confession*, but his dictatorial and conspiratorial tendencies, and his class and race prejudices, have more to do with the old revolutionary tradition which he joined in his youth than with the new one which he helped to found in his old age.

ONCE IT IS RECOGNIZED that Bakunin's *Confession* has little value as either a psychological or a political document, it is possible to assess its value as a biographical and historical document. Bakunin never wrote an autobiography, though he left several fragments, and the *Confession* is his only extended memoir of his early revolutionary career. Because of its origins, however, it is not so much a factual account of his activity from 1840 to 1849 as a fictional account of his attitude to it in 1851, and it must be corrected by other contemporary material. Some of the inevitable errors and omissions are clarified in Orton's notes, but a more serious problem is the general distortion deriving from Bakunin's simultaneous effort to disguise and to defend his behavior to his greatest enemy, and—like Nicholas I himself—we should find the result interesting but not convincing.

So, while it is good that the *Confession* is available in English at last, it would be wrong to take it too literally, and it is sad that so few of Bakunin's later and more significant works have been translated. The *Confession* now joins English editions of *The Reaction in Germany, God and the State, The Paris Commune and the Idea of the State,* and half a dozen English anthologies, but the great mass of his writings remains unavailable. There are still no plans for a collection of his works in English, or even complete translations of most of his longer writings. Nor is there yet a biography in English to replace E. H. Carr's *Michael Bakunin*, which for 40

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years has fixed his image as a fanatic and a fantasist. Bakunin—and here he does represent the anarchist movement—is still as widely misunderstood as he was a century ago, and a new edition of the *Confession* makes this situation worse, not better. ❑

COLLECTED POEMS 1919–1976, by Allen Tate. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 218 pp., $12.50.

Transcending Prufrock

RADCLIFFE SQUIRES

BORN IN 1899 IN KENTUCKY, Allen Tate is almost the last living representative of "Modernist" literature. The term "Modernism" applies to the period that succeeded the final gestures of nineteenth century feeling and is defined by the reformation imposed on literary modes by such writers as T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and James Joyce. Among the various aspects of modernism one dominant concern emerges, a concern with the difficulty, indeed the impossibility, of "heroic" or "public" action. Tate's poetry has made significant and original contributions to that concern. And since, for the first time, he has agreed to the publication of a *Collected Poems,* we are granted an opportunity to contemplate that contribution on the basis of all the evidence.

Tate's literary career began when, as an undergraduate at Vanderbilt University in the early 1920s, he joined other poets, including John Crowe Ransom and Robert Penn Warren, in the short-lived "Fugitive" group. The members were held together more by enthusiasm and friendship than by common literary aims, but most of them did agree on the superiority of Southern culture. Subsequently they banded together as a Southern agrarian group of intellectuals who were opposed to what they saw as the oppression of an industrialism helped along by a tyrannical federal government. They wrote essays on politics, religion, and economics. Tate's forays into public manifestos, public positions, in the long run gave his poetry particularity and definition.

In recent years Tate has upon a few occasions expressed a worry about the state of contemporary poetry. He has found it hopelessly focused on personal trivialities. This judgment might at first seem surprising, for most of his own poems proceed from recollections of private experience. And yet even his very early poems were trying to do what the best of his later poems magnificently succeeded in doing—to relate personal experience to something larger; or, to put it better, to translate personal experience into universal experience.

That translation was not exactly easy for Tate because for a time he tended to accept Eliot's view that modern man was inevitably subjective and was characterized by a "dissociation of sensibility," in which sad state one might feel but not do more than feel. Hence, in the poem which first brought Tate fame, his "Ode to the Confederate Dead" (1927), the visitor to a Confederate graveyard is moved but cannot move, he feels but does not act.

> *What shall we say who have knowledge*
> *Carried to the heart? Shall we take the act*
> *To the grave?*

The ode established the terms of Tate's rhetoric—brilliantly metaphoric, elusively schematic, formal yet haggard. But the concept of "dissociation of sensibility" was not one Tate was content to stay with. Soon enough, he moved away from a Prufrockian position of abdication. Ironically, he moved away by becoming even more despairing than Eliot and by making his despair more specifically historical than Eliot's. He began to argue against decadence by something like a *reductio ad absurdum,* or parody. The remarkable poems of this stance are "Last Days of Alice" (1931) and "The Mediterranean" (1933). In "Last Days of Alice" Lewis Carroll's Alice, having taken up residence on the other side of the looking glass, grows fat and smug. She embodies a mordant freedom from sensibility, even from "dissociation of sensibility," for by inhabiting a positivistic or scientistic universe she has become simply an abstraction. The cry behind the poem is a lamentation for a loss in life of tangibility and love. In "The Mediterranean" Tate thinks of the prophecy that Aeneas should find, know, and establish a homeland, and of how this epic journey contrasts with the faded hopes of the westward migrations to America.

*FROM THESE VERY NEGA*tive views of the aridity and misdirection of modern life, Tate moved on to establish a regenerative view of life. During an amazing spurt of creativity at the end of World War II, he wrote one of the century's most magisterial poems, "Seasons of the Soul." In this long, four-part poem, he claws his way up through personal grief and guilt to a thin ledge of hope. Furthermore, we see that the personal experience is made universal by being drawn into a parallel with a greater experience, for at the end of the poem, in an ecstasy of illumination, he thinks of St. Augustine's account of his mother's (St. Monica's) death:

> *Come, mother, and lean*
> *At the window with your son*
> *And gaze through its light frame*
> *These fifteen centuries*
> *Upon the shirking scene*
> *Where men, blind, go lame . . .*

That word "blind" in "Seasons of the Soul" foreordains Tate's greatest poems, written in the early 1950s, for these poems aim to cure blindness by the assertion of vision. There are only three poems (though they were once thought of as parts of a more comprehensive series), and they reconstruct Tate's progress as a thinker, a lover, and a poet. The first of them, "The Maimed Man," revisits a youthful time when he found his heart and head in imbalance. That perhaps is equivalent to the time when he foundered in that concept of "dissociation of sensibility." The second poem, "The Swimmers," discovers in a childhood memory of a lynching the terrible initiation into guilt which is, of course, also an initiation into the terrors of moral responsibility. Finally, "The Buried Lake" moves through a recollection of nightmares and failure to a restored world, pristine, pastoral, tangible, visual. That movement is made possible by love and Christian faith, objectifying universalities that release him from subjectivity and worldly tyranny. Because the poems establish this freedom for the poet without sentimentality, without pretense or cheap ease, they establish this freedom for the reader as well. *Multa gratia,* Allen. ❑

RADCLIFFE SQUIRES is professor of English at the University of Michigan. His books include Allen Tate: A Literary Biography *and other works of criticism.*

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Locating Today

This is only today. We can
lead our dogs, or be led, and
so the sun on a leash the world
knows well circles and is circled.
Myself, busy about my garden, or
hurrying out to the beach, I puzzle
big things like the sun. They can't know
how big or little I care about them.

The whole arc of heaven may blunder
out there alone while I bend over some
suddenly important, long neglected rock
that happens to gleam for a minute where
the touch of my eyes makes the day stop,
and then its little engine wake up and beat again.

It Can Happen

Sometimes it happens you've expected
usual things, but for no reason
that you can see it's all changed.
You go along a street that's familiar
where people know you, and all at once
it could be a planet so strange that
your life thrills to break loose like a wire.

You suddenly know that you shouldn't
ever have assumed even your name,
that odd sound, or the face you somehow
have come to accept. Coming down the walk
toward you are these grotesque beings—legs,
arms, a slash for a mouth, maybe a hat
that has no brim, or only one side to it.

A babble comes from the mouths and you
understand it, but you feel sorry. After that
day, you stay the same: you balance
carefully and speak to your friends; you
don't want to alarm them, awaken
the strangeness that you know can come.You walk
with care, that they not know.

Duty Visit

The light that sprang crazy into their lives
caught window, chair, table at an odd angle
and froze into a thin, garrulous whine—
all the sounds of the world coming in. They opened
their door for us into slow time. Even their
cat had to decide where to step, and
once when that puppy got into their house
they stared like an alarm going off. Imagine
a life with something slow and wrong
with every move, an examined regret
saved up for every event. And it's true,
you know, that nothing you'll ever do
but has its cost and could have been different.
The dry light scraped on the furniture
when we left. After a block,
I skipped: the dirt and the wind were back
and nobody cared. "Oh God," I breathed.
You looked at me. "Nothing," I said.

News Events

1
Alone as an ant exploring a leaf
—which way on this tree is down?—
a girl is crumpling her handkerchief
and walking through town.

2
Three men repairing the pavement look up.
They shuffle their feet; they speak
together and make little jokes
before they go on.

3
Sunlight is counting the stones, a dove
begins to usher in evening.
A day for having a good one of
has slipped away somehow.

WILLIAM STAFFORD

WILLIAM STAFFORD lives in Oregon and teaches at Lewis and Clark College. Among his books of poetry are Allegiances *and* Traveling through the Dark.

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FILM

***A NIGHT FULL OF RAIN*, directed by Lina Wertmuller.**

***THE DUELLISTS*, directed by Ridley Scott.**

Screams from a marriage

STEPHEN HARVEY

WAY BACK IN THE YEAR 1976, in the pre-Fassbinder *Urzeit,* Lina Wertmuller was the art house flavor-of-the-month, lauded on every arts and leisure page as a kind of superhuman amalgam of Fellini, Simone de Beauvoir, and Hannah Arendt. In the wake of these accolades such a short time ago, the critical reaction to *A Night Full of Rain,* her newest work, has had a particularly indignant edge to it, as though, by turning out such a fiasco, she had betrayed the faith of her followers. Admittedly, her latest is pretty terrible, but then her others left quite a bit to be desired too, once you penetrated the smoke screen of hype and subtitles and actually looked at and listened to them. Movies like *Swept Away* and *The Seduction of Mimi* may seem a lot more insightful, not to mention uproarious, if you are innocent of Italian. (At the same time, only hysterical blindness could justify the claims made for Wertmuller as an enlightened feminist, in the face of the whores, madonnas, and rich bitches who populate her movies.) Now that she has made a film in some semblance of English, Wertmuller's simple-minded stridency is so apparent that even her most committed advocates are bound to be dismayed.

To be fair, Wertmuller has placed herself at a grave disadvantage by choosing to work in a language with which she is barely conversant, but at least she might have had the sense to hire someone else to write the screenplay for her—even Antonioni knew enough to do that when he made films like *Zabriskie Point* and *The Passenger.* The full title of this film, *The End of the World in Our Usual Bed in a Night Full of Rain,* should give you some idea of Wertmuller's scintillating command of the idiom. Although most of the movie takes place in Italy, even the Italian characters speak English to each other, and the dialogue is so stilted that a few lucid subtitles might well have been in order. Most of it sounds like *Corriere della Sera* journalese translated word by word with an Italian-English glossary stapled to the script. Every so often Wertmuller flaunts her fluency by casually tossing in a few choice colloquialisms. "Schmuck! Son of a bitch!" brays Candice Bergen (about 12 times during the course of the movie). "Ball breaker!" retorts Giancarlo Giannini, with phonetically schooled relish. Gertrude Stein would have loved it.

EVEN IF EVERYONE HAD REMAINED blissfully mute throughout, *A Night Full of Rain* would have amounted to little more than a succession of pop placards stretching in Burma Shave fashion toward an ever elusive Great Truth. The plot couldn't be simpler: While a storm wreaked by some ecological imbalance rages without, sexist Italian Communist Giannini and bourgeois American feminist Bergen rattle around in an overstuffed Roman apartment, poking through the embers of their marriage. From the sidelines, opposing Greek choruses of tittering chauvinists and female harpies goad them on, spurred by the sight of all this marital bloodshed. This unhappy pair is a matched set of walking, screeching dolls, and naturally their marriage is in the state it is in thanks to the awful condition of the world out there—My Lai and all that. Wertmuller seems to think that mere mention of our contemporary calamities automatically infuses her work with political significance, rather in the way that characters in Broadway comedies invoke New York by dropping quips about Bloomingdale's and Herman Badillo. Visually, the movie is as cluttered as Giannini's *pied-à-terre,* as Wertmuller's camera zooms in promiscuously on black and white stills of the placid past and cataclysmic present, baroque stone cherubs and latter-day human gargoyles. With all her emphasis on the disasters supposedly raining down upon us in this modern age, Wertmuller seemingly isn't interested in showing what that terrible world outside really looks like: During flashbacks detailing Bergen and Giannini's courtship, she even manages to make San Francisco look like Los Angeles.

As *A Night Full of Rain* lurches along to its soggy final fade-out, Wertmuller lavishes more close-ups on her co-stars than Norma Shearer ever had in her entire career. These serve little purpose apart from satiating those few who are enchanted by Giannini's scrofulous beard and baleful, bespectacled eyes, and Bergen's chiseled mannequin's profile. Giannini's repertoire of squints and shuffles isn't particularly disarming when neither you nor he has much idea of what he is supposed to be saying. Apart from one grandstand display of hysterics, Bergen is as stolid as ever; after all these years in the movies, the only thing she does with any authority is to toss her blonde mane languorously. At the movie's end, Bergen is huddled in bed with her snoozing husband, all passion and anger spent, her face glazed with anguish and uncertainty. Audiences are likely to leave the theater in a similar condition, but if *A Night Full of Rain* serves to deflate Wertmuller's mystique even a little, it won't have been worthless after all.

Bergen is as stolid as ever; the only thing she does with authority is toss her blonde mane languorously.

AT THIS VERY MOMENT, some enterprising film student is doubtless secreted in the stacks of a graduate library somewhere to compile a thesis on *The Precipitous Decline and Fall of the British Film,* which

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thankfully spares me the necessity of dealing with that weighty topic here. Suffice it to say that in recent years, the output of the British movie industry has rivaled that of Albania for skimpiness and squalor. Apart from chrome-plated international co-productions gleaned from James Bond and Agatha Christie and the occasional cheesy spinoff of home-grown sitcoms that will never make it to "Masterpiece Theater," indigenous English movies seem to have gone the way of J. Arthur Rank, the *Queen Mary,* and other such symbols of departed Empire.

All of which makes the arrival of a small revelation like *The Duellists* that much more remarkable. With the best-known local talent either unemployed or working in America, somehow Ridley Scott, a director of TV commercials who had never made a feature film before, managed to find the backing for this work. A lush adaptation of a Conrad story, the film pivots on a point of honor that most people would be hard-pressed to fathom, while taking great pains to keep the viewer at as great an emotional distance as possible from the two characters at the center of the conflict. Perhaps Scott tried to sweeten the pot for American consumption by casting Keith Carradine and Harvey Keitel in the leads; actually, for all their renown, at present they have about the combined box-office clout of, say, Dana Andrews in his prime. Under the circumstances it is a minor miracle that *The Duellists* ever got made at all, much less that it turned out to be such a beautiful piece of work.

The Duellists takes place during the age of Napoleon, for the most part in France, and it provides a view in microcosm of the grandiose futility of Bonaparte's own imperial designs. As a hussar in the emperor's command, Keitel represents the last obstinate vestige of a fading order; he struts and glowers in dour imitation of his commander-in-chief, blind to the fact that he and his kind are slowly marching toward oblivion. Combat is life itself for this character, his self-worth measured by his prowess in defending his sense of honor—something which in his eyes is assailed as incessantly as the virtue of some medieval fairy-tale princess.

His psychological opposite and lukewarm foe (Carradine) is likewise a career officer, but a far more pragmatic, easygoing sort. The army is his vocation, but hardly the mission that fuels his life, and although he too has been schooled to honor the letter of this elaborate code of duty and pride, the spirit of it all eludes him. In their first meeting, Keitel claims a wound to his dignity when Carradine attempts to arrest him for a breach of military discipline. An impromptu duel ensues, which only widens the rift between them. Over the next two decades, the absurdly implacable Keitel rematerializes everywhere—from war-besieged Russia to placid, provincial France—to confront Carradine, who each time reluctantly submits to the challenge. Ultimately it is clear that while Carradine is the catalyst, time is Keitel's true adversary, impervious to every thrust and parry of his sword.

EACH OF THEIR SHOW-downs—on foot and horseback, in dense forests or bleak plains—constitutes a self-contained episode, isolated by title cards identifying time and place. The disjointed quality that results tends to prevent the viewer from becoming involved in the personal fates of these characters, an obviously intentional effect on Scott's part. These two are portrayed literally as figures in a landscape, squared off in the distance behind branches and mist; it is the world they inhabit and the opposing forces of history they represent, rather than their individual vagaries, that have captured Scott's imagination.

With rare immediacy *The Duellists* throughout evokes what that period must have looked and felt like, mainly because Scott tries something that seems pretty heretical lately—he lets the camera do most of the work. There is no need for dialogue to underscore how much Keitel's compulsive call to arms has intruded on Carradine's life—one shot of his mistress's farewell scrawled in lip rouge on the blade of his sword does it far more concisely, and with a wistful irony no words could match. By focusing on the subtle gradations of natural light—a brick farmhouse warmed by dawn, the afternoon sun dimly penetrating a dusty shop window—these images sum up the visual quality of this period with uncanny precision. At times cinematographer Frank Tidy's perfect still-lifes of bread crusts and cheese wedges verge on the self-consciously "artistic," but beyond his eye for composition, Scott fortunately has the innate instinct for tempo and movement of a born moviemaker. His camera doesn't just record Keitel's confrontations with Carradine—it shapes and comments on them as well, thrusting and cutting on movement in the heat of swordplay, withdrawing dispassionately to observe the carnage as these two driven men take their last flagging whacks at each other.

All things considered, it hardly matters that Carradine is a bit too callow to convey the right note of aristocratic sang-froid, or that Keitel, when muttering lines like "The woods are stinking with Cossacks," sounds rather more like one of the Lords of Flatbush than a cavalier of the realm. The important thing is that this is the most dazzling debut any film-maker has made in a very long time. The controlled virtuosity of a movie like *The Duellists* makes most current directors seem niggardly indeed with the tools of their trade. ❧

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It won't take much to stop the hurt of child abuse.
If we all do just one thing, no matter how small, we can help stop the pain over a million children feel each year. Below are a few suggestions.
Commit yourself to one and do your part to stop the hurt.

I want to stop the hurt.
(I'll check the commitment I've made and mail it in.)

- ☐ I'll show my child some love. (Sometimes I forget.)
- ☐ All I know about child abuse is hearsay. I'd like some facts. I'll mail in this coupon.
- ☐ I'll treat my child as a person, not a possession.
- ☐ I'll praise my children more often.
- ☐ I'll volunteer time to my local child abuse prevention organization. If there is none, I will try to start one.
- ☐ I'll spend more time with my children, starting tonight.
- ☐ I'll learn painless ways to tell my child "No".
- ☐ I'll learn the difference between discipline and abuse.
- ☐ I'll try to help a troubled parent by being a foster parent for a while.
- ☐ I'll treat my children the way I wish I had been treated as a child.
- ☐ I have a problem. I'm going to start talking about it.
- ☐ I'll help a troubled parent. I'll be a friend and a good listener. After all, it shouldn't hurt to be a parent, either.
- ☐ I'd like a one-year membership in the National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse. Enclosed is $10.00.

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